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Statutory Genres: Substance, Procedure, Jurisdiction
Karen Petroski*
To decide many cases, courts need to characterize some of the legal
rules involved, placing each one in a specific doctrinal category to
identify the rule’s effect on the litigation. The consequences of
characterization decisions can be profound, but the grounds for making
and justifying them are often left unstated. This Article offers the first
systematic comparison of two important types of legal characterization:
the distinction between substantive and procedural rules or statutes, a
distinction federal courts make in several contexts; and the distinction
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rules, especially those
relating to litigation filing requirements. The Article explains the
reasons for the differences between the doctrines governing each type of
characterization by contextualizing each as an example of the same
activity: the identification of the “genre,” or kind, to which particular
legal texts belong. Showing that decisions in both areas do in fact
involve genre classification, the Article explains how it follows that
legal characterization is an aspect of legal interpretation, although
courts have seldom recognized as much. This analysis further suggests
new lines of development for both Erie doctrine and jurisdictional
characterization. Judges making Erie decisions should characterize
both the state and federal laws at issue according to their sources, as
well as under the substantive-procedural rubric, and should recognize
that the question of conflict, if reached, is akin to other questions of
federal preemption. Judges making jurisdictional-characterization
decisions should extend the existing doctrinal framework to take into
account other consequences of characterization and to allow the
analogous handling of federal rules. The U.S. Supreme Court already
has most of the resources it needs to move down these paths. Still,
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courts and commentators have something to learn from contemporary
theories of discourse genres, which teach that every classificatory
decision changes, even if only slightly, the landscape of existing
categories.
For this reason, purely formalist approaches to
characterization doctrine—insistence on bright-line rules for
distinguishing substantive from procedural and jurisdictional from
nonjurisdictional rules—are ill-advised. A functional and incremental
approach to legal characterization is not just theoretically sound, but
also practically necessary for stable, workable law in this area.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent terms, the U.S. Supreme Court decided several cases
turning on apparently technical issues of legal characterization: the
classification of rules of law (primarily statutes, but also judicially
promulgated rules and other legal authorities) into doctrinally defined
categories. 1 In a case raising a characterization issue, the decision to
place a statute or rule in a particular category may determine the case’s
outcome. 2 If the Court’s attention is any gauge, these issues are
important. But the grounds for making and justifying characterization
decisions remain elusive. Justices past and present have disagreed
significantly about when and how such decisions should be made.
This Article is the first to compare two kinds of characterization that
have generated recent controversy: (1) the distinction between
substantive and procedural rules or statutes, a distinction federal courts
make in several contexts; and (2) the distinction between jurisdictional
and nonjurisdictional rules, especially those relating to litigation filing
requirements. 3 (This second distinction might seem to be a subdistinction within the “procedural” category, but as explained below, the
relation between the two distinctions is more complex.) Only a few
commentators have noted the overlap between these two sets of
characterization issues. 4 The overlap is both conceptual and structural;
each type of characterization involves the labeling of a rule or statute as
1. The term “characterization” is used in this sense by Walter Wheeler Cook,
“Characterization” in the Conflict of Laws, 51 YALE L.J. 191 (1941), and Scott Dodson, In
Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 56 (2008) [hereinafter Dodson, Removal
Jurisdiction]. This Article focuses on the Supreme Court’s treatment of the issues discussed.
Other courts must consider the same issues even more often, and many of the arguments
advanced below pertain to these courts’ characterization practices as well. The Supreme Court’s
activity in these areas is institutionally unique, however, whether or not the Court’s decisions do
in fact bind lower federal courts. That question is discussed further infra note 308.
2. Many of the consequences of particular characterizations are uncontroversial. But see the
arguments that these consequences should be considered more carefully by Scott Dodson in the
sources cited infra notes 4 and 123, and supra note 1.
3. Characterization can be determinative in other doctrinal areas, such as First Amendment
law. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (considering purpose-based
classification of a Department of Defense appropriations act transferring land from government to
private party); infra note 252 (noting discussions of categorization in First Amendment doctrine).
Characterization can also be determinative in administrative law. See, e.g., David L. Franklin,
Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276
(2010); infra note 322 (discussing legislative-rule characterization).
4. See, e.g., Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1, 21–51 (1994) (discussing features of jurisdictional rules and their overlaps with rules
affecting the merits); Dodson, Removal Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 59–61 (discussing
differences between jurisdictional and procedural statutes); Scott Dodson, Hybridizing
Jurisdiction, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1443–48 (2011) [hereinafter Dodson, Hybridizing]
(summarizing attributes of “jurisdictionality” and “nonjurisdictionality”).
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a premise for further legal decision-making. While each form of
characterization has prompted significant critique, there has been no
systematic comparative analysis of the two areas of law.
Most lawyers first learn of the substantive-procedural distinction
when they cover the Erie doctrine in their first-year civil procedure
courses. Developed over the past eighty years, Erie doctrine requires a
federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction to apply state law rather
than federal law under certain circumstances. 5 Some formulations of
the doctrine require courts to base this choice on a determination of
whether the federal, and perhaps also the state, laws that might apply
are substantive or procedural in character. As civil procedure students
know, however, the Court has long debated the grounds for making
such determinations, their relevance to the Erie choice-of-law issue, and
their very feasibility. After nearly a decade of silence on the subject,
the Court again took up the issue in its 2010 decision in Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co. 6 In Shady Grove,
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg disagreed sharply about whether a New
York state statute conflicted with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and therefore whether a class action statutorily barred in
state court could proceed in federal court. 7 Their disagreement turned
on whether these two provisions belonged in the same category of
procedural (as opposed to substantive) law. Justice Scalia regarded both
provisions as procedural and therefore concluded the federal court could
not apply state law. 8 In contrast, Justice Ginsburg understood the state
law to be substantive and thus binding on the federal diversity court. 9
Despite their incompatibility, both positions find support in Erie
precedent. But commentators have been largely critical of Shady
Grove, mainly for its failure to clarify an already much-criticized area of
law. 10 Indeed, the opinions seem to reopen questions that some thought
5. See generally Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1437–38.
9. Id. at 1465–66, 1471.
10. See, e.g., Leading Cases, Preemption of State Procedural Rules, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179,
327, 329–30 (2010) (criticizing the majority’s approach to determining “meaning” of the state
statute at issue, and predicting that “the Court’s fractured holding—and even more fractured
reasoning—will continue to frustrate litigants and disempower state legislatures”); Stephen B.
Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 17, 65–66 (2010) (recommending alternative analysis); Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure,
Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877, 903–05 (2011) (“[T]he Court’s present bifurcated
approach to Rules Enabling Act/‘procedural Erie’ issues suffers from a final flaw: it is
inelegant.”); Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 89 WASH.
U. L. REV. 103, 106 (2011) (adding “a new level of critique” to criticisms of recent developments
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the Court had already answered in the early twentieth century. 11 Shady
Grove is troubling, however, not just because it represents a missed
opportunity to tidy up Erie doctrine. The Shady Grove opinions are also
symptomatic of the Court’s continued reluctance to acknowledge the
centrality of characterization issues to Erie doctrine and to draw on its
more successful treatment in other areas.
One such area, the second doctrinal focus of this Article, is
jurisdictional characterization. In its decisions on this subject, the Court
has appeared eager to develop a jurisprudence of characterization 12—so
eager, in fact, that opinions increasingly refer to the doctrine even when
it does not directly apply. For example, in 2011, the Court decided
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 13 a case concerning the
circumstances under which a federal court of appeals might depart from
a statutory requirement for the timing of filing notices of appeal from
denials of veterans’ benefits claims. The Court unanimously held that
the statutory rule in question was nonjurisdictional and, therefore, that
the petitioner should have been permitted to file his appeal. But much
of Justice Alito’s opinion in Henderson addressed the consistency of
this conclusion with other recent decisions addressing jurisdictionalcharacterization issues. 14 This line of cases is rooted in pre-Erie
decisions, 15 but only in the past few decades has it received sustained
in Erie doctrine, including Shady Grove).
11. See, e.g., Edgar H. Ailes, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 MICH. L.
REV. 392, 418 (1941) (“[T]he orthodox distinction of substance and procedure offers a guiding
hand and a convenient working rule.”); Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in
the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 355–56 (1933) (“There is . . . no reason to be disturbed
when we find . . . arbitrariness at the border line [between substantive and procedural law] and . . .
relativity of decision.”); Lehan Kent Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: “Substance” and
“Procedure” after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REV. 271, 302 (1939) (“In any drive
toward flexibility of treatment, the conflict of laws cases present a parallel. From a more or less
iron dichotomy, those cases have come to a place where some courts find no difficulty in calling a
matter ‘procedural’ and giving it ‘substantive’ consequences, if necessary in the solution of a
comparable problem.”).
12. See infra Part II.E (discussing six substantial decisions addressing this type of
characterization since 2009); see also, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-By
Jurisdictional Rulings,” 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 947, 947 (2011) (discussing the trend in
Supreme Court opinions toward “better defining which legal rules properly should be called
‘jurisdictional’”).
13. 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011).
14. Id. at 1202–04.
15. See, e.g., E. King Poor, Jurisdictional Deadlines in the Wake of Kontrick and Eberhart:
Harmonizing 160 Years of Precedent, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 181, 187–90 (2007) (“[B]y the end
of the 1930s, the principle of jurisdictional time limits, recognized . . . almost ninety years before,
was firmly interwoven with the fabric of the law.”); Christopher W. Robbins, Comment,
Jurisdiction and the Federal Rules: Why the Time Has Come to Reform Finality by Inequitable
Deadlines, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 286–88 (2008) (discussing nineteenth-century origins of the
principle).
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attention from the Court. Spurred by commentary, 16 the Justices have
developed a sophisticated, yet still-evolving, consensus on the
appropriate resolution of at least some jurisdictional-characterization
issues.
In addition to explaining the foundations of these recent decisions,
this Article explores the lack of cross-pollination between the two lines
of characterization doctrine and shows how looking beyond the confines
of each can suggest improvements to both. Parts I and II consider the
reasons each characterization puzzle has become important—for
independent and doctrinally path-dependent reasons—and the state of
each doctrine today. Part III explains how, despite their surface
differences, each characterization doctrine is an example of the same
more general activity: the identification of the “genre,” or kind, to
which a particular statute or rule belongs. Part III shows that in
working through this task, the Court anticipated many of the more
recent insights of genre theory, as developed in classical and
Renaissance rhetoric and refined by twentieth-century rhetoricians.
16. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Nonjurisdictionality or Inequity, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 64 (2007) (advocating a functional approach to jurisdictional characterization); Perry
Dane, Sad Time: Thoughts on Jurisdictionality, the Legal Imagination, and Bowles v. Russell,
102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164 (2008) (critiquing the Court’s decisions concerning the
jurisdictionality of time limits); Dodson, Removal Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 56 (discussing the
Court’s treatment of the jurisdictional-characterization issue); Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Dodson, Mandatory]; Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and
Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42 (2007) [hereinafter Dodson, Bowles]
(suggesting an alternative approach to treatment of statutory time limits); Katherine Florey,
Insufficiently Jurisdictional: The Case against Treating State Sovereign Immunity as an Article
III Doctrine, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1375 (2004) (offering critique of references to sovereign immunity
as “jurisdictional” doctrine); Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 1613, 1614 (2003) (arguing that “the conventional wisdom” about jurisdiction is misleading
and, on occasion, “dangerous”); David S. Kantrowitz, Note, Caveat Emptor: Jurisdictional Rules,
Bowles v. Russell, and Reliance on Our Judicial System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 265 (2009) (critiquing
Dodson’s suggested “mandatory rules” approach); Vincent Pavlish, Note, Bowles v. Russell:
They Got Me on a Technicality, 70 MONT. L. REV. 147 (2009) (criticizing the Court’s reasoning
in Bowles v. Russell); Poor, supra note 15 (defending recent Supreme Court decisions but
recommending clarifications); Philip A. Pucillo, Jurisdictional Prescriptions, Nonjurisdictional
Processing Rules, and Federal Appellate Practice: The Implications of Kontrick, Eberhart and
Bowles, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 847 (2007) (offering specific suggestions for clarification of
doctrine governing particular statutory time limits); Johnathan A. Rhodes, Note, The
Jurisdictional Nature of Statutory Time Restrictions, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 605 (2008) (criticizing
labeling of statutory deadlines as “jurisdictional” and advocating for a functional approach);
Robbins, supra note 15, at 285 (“The Court should find statutory deadlines nonjurisdictional by
default unless Congress clearly intended otherwise.”); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and
Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643 (2005) (criticizing doctrine and judicial practice with respect to
jurisdictional issues); Joseph A. Valenti, Recent Decision, Statutory Procedural Deadlines Are
Jurisdictional in Nature for All Civil Cases and Therefore Must Never Be Equitably Excused:
Bowles v. Russell, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 245 (2008) (explaining the inconsistency of Bowles v. Russell
with earlier decisions).
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From this perspective, it also becomes evident that characterization is an
aspect of textual interpretation, something the Court has only
intermittently acknowledged. Considering characterization doctrine in
this light helps to clarify which components of existing doctrine can and
should form the basis for a more comprehensive, functional approach to
each area. Part IV addresses this task, explicitly reviewing what the
Court should preserve and abandon with respect to each type of
characterization.
In brief, substantive-procedural characterization
doctrine should take jurisdictional-characterization doctrine as a model
of the successful integration of formal and functional attitudes toward
legal interpretation in a structured analysis that can command the
allegiance of judges across the methodological spectrum. More
generally, the development of higher-order rules like those involved in
characterization doctrines—rules for the treatment and analysis of other
rules—is inevitable, endemic in many other areas of law and every
complex legal system, and not cause for regret or concern.
I. CHARACTERIZATION TYPE ONE: THE SUBSTANTIVE-PROCEDURAL
DISTINCTION
Substantive-procedural and jurisdictional-characterization doctrines
have developed along contrasting paths.
Substantive-procedural
doctrine has long incorporated skepticism about the stability and
importance of the distinction between substantive and procedural law.
In the Erie context, this skepticism was partly a product of timing, since
the doctrine was born during the heyday of anti-formalist legal realism.
Jurisdictional-characterization doctrine is also a product of its times, but
flowered much later, coming into its own only since the final decades of
the twentieth century, when formalist approaches were reemerging in
many areas of decisional law. This doctrine has accordingly tended,
more formalistically, to assume that legal rules must be susceptible to
unambiguous characterization.
Despite these contrasts, the two
doctrines also have many similarities, as the following discussions of
their respective evolutions show.
A. Development of the Doctrine: An Overview
Legal historians have traced the distinction between substantive and
procedural law back as far as medieval Europe. 17 In the modern era, the
17. The origins of the distinction have been attributed to medieval judicial decisions, Ailes,
supra note 11, at 396; to William Blackstone in the mid-eighteenth century, Thomas O. Main,
The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 805 (2010); and to
Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century, D. Michael Risinger, “Substance” and
“Procedure” Revisited with Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of “Irrebuttable
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distinction initially became significant in the context of conflict-of-laws
decisions in the early United States; then, in the early twentieth century,
it migrated to Erie doctrine, at issue in Shady Grove and the focus of
this Section.
Whatever the original source of the distinction between substantive
and procedural law, it was well enough established in the conflicts field
by the early twentieth century 18 to be criticized by the legal realist
Walter Wheeler Cook. 19 Under then-prevailing conflicts doctrine, a
court would apply foreign law to decide the substance, or merits, of a
dispute, but forum law on procedural issues. Therefore, in jurisdictionspanning disputes, courts needed to be able to characterize particular
rules as substantive or procedural. In a highly influential 1933 article,
Cook argued that “the line between [substance and procedure]” should
not be assumed to be “the same for all purposes.” 20 Cook maintained
that in each conflicts case, the decision to classify a rule as substantive
or procedural should be made in the interest of furthering the general
purposes of conflicts doctrine (the equitable and efficient resolution of
disputes), rather than simply for the sake of adhering to any label courts
might have previously affixed to the rule in question. 21 Cook’s critique
of inflexible, formalist categorization had its own critics, who insisted
that his skepticism failed to respect the functional need for
consistency. 22 But Cook’s point about the context-dependence of
characterization decisions has proven influential, not just in the conflicts
context, 23 but also in Erie doctrine.
Presumptions,” 30 UCLA L. REV. 189, 191, 192 n.16 (1982) (“The procedure-substance
dichotomy . . . was fathered by Jeremy Bentham in a 1782 work entitled Of Laws in General, sub
nom the distinction between substantive law and adjective law.”).
18. See Risinger, supra note 17, at 195 (discussing Dicey’s 1896 conflicts treatise and the
alignment of “procedure” with remedial law in this context).
19. Cook apparently objected to being classed as a legal realist, but his perspective was
aligned with that of his avowed realist contemporaries. See, e.g., Michael S. Green, Legal
Realism, Lex Fori, and the Choice-of-Law Revolution, 104 YALE L.J. 967, 969 n.13 (1995)
(“Although Cook objected to being labeled a realist, the descriptive or functional approach to the
law that he employed is a cornerstone of realist jurisprudence. Cook has been included among
the legal realists for just this reason.” (citations omitted)).
20. Cook, supra note 11, at 337.
21. Id. at 341–43 (“[A] person asking where the line ought to be drawn might well conclude
that this ought to be at one place for one purpose and at a somewhat different place for
another . . . .”).
22. See, e.g., Ailes, supra note 11, at 406–08 (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing
between substance and procedure, and arguing that “we need not choose between the rock of an
inflexible rule and the whirlpool of no rule at all”).
23. See, e.g., Laura Cooper, Statutes of Limitations in Minnesota Choice of Law: The
Problematic Return of the Substance-Procedure Distinction, 71 MINN. L. REV. 363, 368–69, 373
(1986) (presenting Cook-influenced critique of recent developments in choice-of-law doctrine);
Susan Swilling Craft, Case Comment, Choice of Law—Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman: The
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Erie doctrine gets its name from the Court’s 1938 decision in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 24 Erie concerned the meaning and
implications of the Rules of Decision Act (RDA), 25 which requires
federal courts to apply state law rules “in cases where they apply.” 26
The development of Erie doctrine is also bound up, however, with the
enactment of the Rules Enabling Act (REA) 27 in 1934 and the initial
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Since its inception, Erie
doctrine has moved through three phases, marked by shifts in the
Court’s attitudes toward the relative authority of federal and state
sources of law, 28 and toward the importance and nature of
characterization. In the first period, from 1938 to 1965, the Court
searched for a formula for making Erie decisions and, acknowledging
the blurriness of the line between substance and procedure, did not
insist that characterization played a role in the analysis. In the second
period, from 1965 to 1998, the Court ostensibly adopted a brighter-line,
more formalist doctrine. At the same time, because of a growing
concern with the Court’s analyses, academics began to propose tests for
making the Erie choice that presupposed an even brighter line between
substantive and procedural laws. In the third period, from 1996 to the
present, judicial consensus on characterization issues has evaporated.
Justices have disagreed about the need for substantive-procedural
characterization, the terms in which it should be used, and its place in
Erie analysis. Some of the scholarly commentary, however, has
Constitutionality of the Lex Fori Approach to Statutes of Limitation, 19 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 407,
419 (1989) (noting the parallel between functionalist “interest analysis” approach in modern
choice-of-law and Erie doctrine); Dustin K. Palmer, Comment, Should Prejudgment Interest Be a
Matter of Procedural or Substantive Law in Choice-of-Law Disputes?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 705,
727–28 (2002) (arguing that for choice-of-law purposes, “[c]ourts should interpret prejudgment
interest rules dynamically, as opposed to statically”); Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance
of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 1030–31 (1994) (“[T]o pretend that choice of
law principles should be determinative in all multistate cases is to increase obfuscation in an area
already characterized more by mud than by crystal.”); Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law: The
Limitations Debates, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 690 (“[C]ourts should choose limitations law
without formulaic contrivances, employing ordinary purposive reasoning.”).
24. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
26. The RDA currently provides, “The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply.” Id.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
28. In a recent article, Jennifer Hendricks describes the phases of Erie doctrine along these
lines. See generally Hendricks, supra note 10. Specifically, she describes, first, a “deference to
the states” period lasting from 1938 to 1965, id. at 110–13; second, an “[i]mperial [Federal]
Rules” period from 1965 to the early 1990s, id. at 113–17; and third, a “[w]ay to [n]owhere”
period of confusion since the early 1990s, id. at 117–24.
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continued along the trajectory marked out previously, urging formal
resolutions of these disagreements and seeming less and less tolerant of
the idea that such resolutions might remain elusive.
B. Phase One: Skepticism about Characterization (1938–1965)
At the time of the Erie decision and the promulgation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, five years had passed since the publication of
Cook’s article. 29 The implications of these events for one another
would not become fully evident for decades, even though both Erie and
the Federal Rules made characterization questions important to legal
analysis.
In Erie, the Court held that the RDA required a federal court sitting in
diversity to apply state law defining the elements of, and defenses to, a
claim for negligence. 30 Justice Brandeis, author of the majority
opinion, made only passing reference to the distinction between
substantive and procedural law, observing in a discussion of the
constitutional basis for the decision that “Congress has no power to
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state . . . .”31
Justice Reed’s concurrence more directly anticipated the later
significance of the substantive-procedural distinction to Erie
jurisprudence. 32 Disagreeing with the constitutional component of
Justice Brandeis’s opinion, Justice Reed maintained that a federal
lawmaking power did indeed exist: “The line between procedural and
substantive law is hazy, but no one doubts federal power over
procedure.” 33 Justice Reed’s reference to the “hazy” line between the
categories, and his acknowledgment of the link between this distinction
and the allocation of legal authority, was consistent both with Cook’s
argument 34 and with then-current views of substantive law as dealing
with ends and procedural law with means to those ends. 35
Such views had underlain the enactment of the REA four years
29. See generally Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Cook, supra note 11.
30. Id. at 70–72, 80.
31. Id. at 78.
32. Id. at 90–92 (Reed, J., concurring). See Hendricks, supra note 10, at 111–12 (making a
similar observation).
33. Erie, 304 U.S. at 92.
34. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 11, at 335–37 and accompanying explanatory parentheticals;
Tunks, supra note 11, at 277 (“[M]any items waver from one category to the other, a fact best
explained by reference to the purposes for which the classifications were made.”).
35. See, e.g., SIR JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE OR THE THEORY OF THE LAW 577–78
(1902) (discussed in Risinger, supra note 17, at 197); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1052, 1058–60, 1068 (1982) (discussing attempts by state
and federal legislatures in the early twentieth century to draw a line between substantive law and
procedural law in an effort to codify substantive law).
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earlier. That statute empowered the Supreme Court to create rules
regulating the “practice and procedure” of the federal courts, so long as
any such rules did not “abridge, enlarge[,] or modify any substantive
right.” 36 The REA thus codified the substantive-procedural distinction
as an aspect of, and a crucial limitation on, federal lawmaking power.
Many state constitutions contained (and still contain) similar
distinctions. 37 As later Supreme Court decisions would make clear, in
order to determine whether a rule was consistent with the REA and thus
valid, a court needed to be able to classify the rule—to decide whether it
was a rule of “procedure” or not. Although the statute thus seemed to
mandate characterization, neither its drafters nor the drafters of the
Federal Rules agreed about how characterization decisions should be
made; both groups contested the characterization of particular types of
rules as substantive or procedural. 38 Such disagreements confirmed
Cook’s point that particular rules might serve substantive purposes in
some contexts and procedural purposes in others. But as suggested
below, the existence of these disagreements has never completely
discouraged more formalist, absolutist approaches to these issues.
Reflecting this early controversy, the Court made the substantiveprocedural distinction key to an Erie analysis nine years later, in
Sibbach v. Wilson, 39 without offering a clear standard to use in drawing
the distinction. 40 Sibbach concerned the validity of Rule 35 and Rule
37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under which a district court
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
37. See, e.g., Thomas A. Bishop, Evidence Rulemaking: Balancing the Separation of Powers,
43 CONN. L. REV. 265, 275 (2010) (discussing constitutionality of state evidence rules under state
constitutional provisions resembling the REA); Michael P. Dickey, The Florida Evidence Code
and the Separation of Powers Doctrine: How to Distinguish Substance and Procedure Now that
It Matters, 34 STETSON L. REV. 109, 111 (2004) (discussing the importance of distinction to
assessing the constitutionality of the Florida Evidence Code); Kent R. Hart, Note, Court
Rulemaking in Utah Following the 1985 Revision of the Utah Constitution, 1992 UTAH L. REV.
153, 161 (discussing the Utah equivalent to the REA); Allen L. Lanstra, Jr., Case Note,
McDougall v. Schanz: Distinguishing the Authorities of the Michigan Legislature and the
Michigan Supreme Court to Establish Rules of Evidence, 2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L.
857, 859–60 (discussing the Michigan equivalent to the REA); Robert G. Lawson, Modifying the
Kentucky Rules of Evidence—A Separation of Powers Issue, 88 KY. L.J. 525, 545–46, 549–50
(1999–2000) (discussing the Kentucky equivalent to the REA); Patrick Vrobel, Note, Harnessing
the Hired Guns: The Substantive Nature of Ohio Revised Code § 2743.43 Under Article IV,
Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution, 21 J.L. & HEALTH 123, 133–34 (2008) (discussing the
Ohio equivalent to the REA).
38. See Burbank, supra note 35, at 1131–33 (discussing limitations of the REA).
39. 312 U.S. 1, 10–14 (1941).
40. In 1974, John Hart Ely identified Sibbach as the first case to suggest that the substantiveprocedural distinction might be central to Erie decisions and noted that the case treated the
distinction as unproblematic. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV.
693, 708, 737–38 (1974).
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had ordered a plaintiff to submit to a medical examination in the face of
state law forbidding orders of this kind. 41 Writing for the majority,
Justice Roberts described the decision as turning on the Rules’ validity
under the REA, 42 which “was purposely restricted in its operation to
matters of pleading and court practice and procedure.” 43 Accepting
without discussion that “substantive” matters are meaningfully distinct
from procedural ones, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
laws pertaining to “‘important’ or ‘substantial’ rights” should be classed
as “substantive.” 44 The Court, however, did not clarify what could
qualify a law as “substantive”; instead, the majority focused on what
could qualify a law as “procedural.” “The test,” Justice Roberts stated,
“must be whether a rule really regulates procedure[]—the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law[,]
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them.” 45 As Justice Frankfurter’s skeptical dissent made
clear, the clarity of this “test” was not apparent to the entire Court: “[I]t
does not seem to me that the answer . . . is to be found by an analytic
determination whether the power of examination here claimed is a
matter of procedure or a matter of substance, even assuming that the
two are mutually exclusive categories with easily ascertainable
contents.” 46
Justice Frankfurter’s skepticism on this point also shaped his majority
opinion in the next major Erie decision, Guaranty Trust Co. of New
York v. York, in which the Court turned to an alternative test.47
Guaranty Trust presented the issue of whether a state statute of
limitations should apply in a class action brought on diversity grounds
“on the equity side of a federal district court.” 48 According to Justice
Frankfurter, it did not matter whether the statute of limitations had been
“deemed a matter of ‘procedure’” by other courts; 49 the focus in an Erie
41. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 1, 6–7.
42. Id. at 9–11.
43. Id. at 10.
44. Id. at 11.
45. Id. at 14.
46. Id. at 17 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In a seeming departure from a Cook-style approach,
Justice Frankfurter argued that the decision should be justified solely by reference to Supreme
Court precedent. Id.
47. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). It was in this case, according to Ely, that the Court first tried to
develop a clear test for making REA decisions. Ely, supra note 40, at 708.
48. 326 U.S. at 101.
49. See id. at 109 (“It is . . . immaterial whether statutes of limitation are characterized either
as ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural’ in State court opinions in any use of these terms unrelated to the
specific issue before us. Erie . . . was not an endeavor to formulate scientific legal
terminology.”).

ARTICLES_4_PETROSKI.DOCX

202

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

11/6/2012 11:34 AM

[Vol. 44

decision should be on
whether such a statute concerns merely the manner and the means by
which a right to recover . . . is enforced, or whether [it] . . . is a matter
of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant . . . , namely, does it
significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to
disregard a law . . . that would be controlling in an action upon the
same claim by the same parties in a [s]tate court? 50

Justice Frankfurter advocated this functional approach not exactly
because he considered the substantive-procedural distinction irrelevant,
but rather because he acknowledged its context-dependence. 51 In
dissent, Justice Rutledge argued that acknowledging the instability of
the distinction between substance and procedure called for more careful
application of the terms, rather than refusal to use them. 52 This
contrast—between a temptation to dismiss the substantive-procedural
distinction as a labeling matter peripheral to the real issues at stake
(Justice Frankfurter’s position) and an embrace of the labels as useful, if
delicate, tools for handling those issues (Justice Rutledge’s position)—
persists in contemporary Erie doctrine. Indeed, the analysis below will
50. Id.
51. See id. at 108 (“Matters of ‘substance’ and matters of ‘procedure’ are much talked about in
the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law. But, of
course . . . [n]either ‘substance’ nor ‘procedure’ represents the same invariants. Each implies
different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used.”).
52. Justice Rutledge described the instability in both territorial and aesthetic terms:
[I]n some instances, the[] application [of particular rules] may lie along the border
between procedure or remedy and substance, where the one may or may not be in fact
but another name for the other. It is exactly in this borderland, where procedural or
remedial rights may or may not have the effect of determining the substantive ones
completely, that caution is required in extending the rule of the Erie case . . . .
The words ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ or ‘remedial’ are not talismanic. Merely
calling a legal question by one or the other does not resolve it otherwise than as a
purely authoritarian performance. But they have come to designate[,] in a broad way[,]
large and distinctive legal domains within the greater one of the law[,] and to mark,
though often indistinctly or with overlapping limits, many divides between such
regions.
One of these . . . has been the divide between the substantive law and the
procedural[,] or remedial[,] law to be applied by the federal courts in diversity cases[,]a
division sharpened[,] but not wiped out[,] by Erie. . . . The large division between
adjective law and substantive law still remains, to divide the power of Congress from
that of the states and consequently to determine the power of the federal courts to apply
federal law or state law . . . .
This division, like others drawn by the broad allocation of adjective or remedial and
substantive, has areas of admixture of these two aspects of the law. In these areas,
whether a particular situation or issue presents one aspect or the other depends upon
how one looks at the matter. As form cannot always be separated from substance in a
work of art, so adjective or remedial aspects cannot be parted entirely from substantive
ones in these borderland regions.
Id. at 115–16 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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suggest that Justice Rutledge’s take more accurately describes
subsequent developments: the labeling-cum-characterization distinction
remains one of the vehicles for discussion of the other issues at stake in
Erie cases, so that failure to confront the characterization issue in its
own right may have contributed to the Court’s inability to achieve
consensus on related matters.
Over the fifteen years following Guaranty Trust, the Court’s major
Erie decisions followed Justice Frankfurter’s preferred path of
avoidance. 53 In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,
decided in 1949, the Court again confronted a choice between a state
statute of limitations and a federal rule that supported a different
determination of the action. 54 While acknowledging that the Federal
Rules “determine the manner in which an action is commenced in the
federal courts[,] a matter of procedure which . . . Erie . . . does not
control,” the Court concluded that in this case, as in Guaranty Trust, it
could not “give [the cause of action] longer life than it would have had
in the state court without adding something to the cause of action.” 55
Nine years later, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, the
last major decision of the first phase of Erie doctrine, the Court held
that a personal injury plaintiff in federal court was entitled to have a
jury decide whether the plaintiff had been the defendant’s employee as
defined by statute, even though the state law that set forth the relevant
definition of “employee” also committed that issue to the trial judge for
decision. 56 The key question, according to the Byrd majority, was not
whether the state rule was substantive or procedural, but the
“affirmative countervailing consideration” of how the Seventh
Amendment and Federal Rules established to enforce that state rule
“distribute[] trial functions between judge and jury . . . .” 57 Moreover,
of the three opinions offered in addition to the majority opinion (which
included a dissent by Justice Frankfurter), only Justice Whittaker’s
mentioned substantive-procedural characterization, and it did so without
conceding the utility of the distinction. 58 After Byrd, it seemed that the
53. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 40, at 729–32 (arguing that Ragan exemplified the fluidity of the
substance-procedure distinction).
54. 337 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1949).
55. Id.
56. 356 U.S. 525, 531–32 (1958).
57. Id. at 537.
58. Justice Whittaker, largely summarizing parts of Justice Rutledge’s Guaranty Trust dissent,
see supra note 52, wrote:
The words ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ are mere conceptual labels and in no sense
talismanic. To call a legal question by one or the other of these terms does not resolve
the question otherwise than as a purely authoritarian performance. When a question[,]
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tension apparent in Guaranty Trust concerning substantive-procedural
characterization had been resolved in favor of Justice Frankfurter’s
dismissive position. Most of the Justices at this point appeared to
regard characterization as a distraction from the appropriate analysis in
Erie cases.
C. Phase Two: Resurgence of the REA and Characterization Analysis
(1965–1996)
The second period of Erie doctrine jurisprudence saw renewed
attention to the distinction discarded in the late 1940s and 1950s. But
following its 1965 decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 59 which took off from
the position Justice Reed had mapped out in his Erie concurrence and
helped to pinpoint the place of characterization issues in at least some
Erie cases, the Court disavowed any need for further doctrinal
development. The result was an increasingly muddled stance on the
role of characterization in Erie analysis.
In Hanna, the Court explicitly set out to renovate and clarify Erie
doctrine, at least in cases requiring a choice between application of a
federal rule and a different state law standard. 60 The Court held in
Hanna that service on a defendant would be proper if completed in
accordance with Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(permitting “substituted service” on a competent person at the
defendant’s residence), despite a state law requirement of in-person
service of certain complaints. 61 Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the
majority identified the central issue in the case as the validity of Rule
4(d)(1) under the REA. 62 On this premise, only the federal law at issue
needed to be characterized as substantive or procedural:
The broad command of Erie was . . . [originally] identical to that of
the Enabling Act: federal courts are to apply state substantive law and

though denominated ‘procedural,’ is nevertheless so ‘substantive’ as materially to
affect the result of a trial, federal courts, in enforcing state-created rights, are not free
to disregard it on the ground that it is ‘procedural,’ for such would be to allow, upon
mere nomenclature, a different result in a state court from that allowable in a federal
court though both are, in effect, courts of the State . . . .
Byrd, 356 U.S. at 549 (Whittaker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
60. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer
Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 852 (1974); Note,
The Law Applied in Diversity Cases: The Rules of Decision Act and the Erie Doctrine, 85 YALE
L.J. 678, 695 (1976) (discussing the standard proposed by Justice Harlan).
61. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473–74.
62. See id. at 464 (“Under the cases construing . . . the Enabling Act, Rule 4(d)(1) clearly
passes muster. Prescribing the manner in which a defendant is to be notified that a suit has been
instituted against him, it relates to the ‘practice and procedure of the district courts.’”).
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federal procedural law. However, as subsequent cases sharpened the
distinction between substance and procedure, the line of cases
following Erie diverged markedly from the line construing the
Enabling Act. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York made it clear
that Erie-type problems were not to be solved by reference to any
traditional or common-sense substance-procedure distinction. 63

This divergence between the two strands of law, the opinion later
explained, was compelled by the nature of the substantive-procedural
distinction: “[T]he development of two separate lines of cases [has not]
been inadvertent. The line between ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ shifts
as the legal context changes.” 64 In light of this acknowledged contextdependent standard, Hanna eschewed formalism in the “relatively
unguided” terrain of cases involving no Federal Rule, 65 but seemed to
encourage it for purposes of assessing REA compliance. The decision
thus more precisely identified the range of questions to which
characterization might provide an answer. But Hanna did not present
guidelines for characterizing any particular rules or statutes. 66
Moreover, given that the Supreme Court has consistently treated
Hanna as a mere clarification of existing precedent rather than an initial
step in the further development of Erie doctrine, the Court has never
resolved whether characterization of state rules is a necessary
component of Erie decisions. In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., for
example, the Court unanimously denied that Hanna had changed the
Erie landscape so much as to require a different answer to the question
presented in Ragan. 67 In explaining why state law should apply in
Walker, Justice Marshall noted that the case did not (as Hanna had)
involve a “collision” between a federal rule and state law. 68 But the
Court also based its conclusion on characterization of the state law at
issue. 69 That is, instead of assuming a conflict and asking whether the
Federal Rule was procedural and therefore valid, as it had in Hanna, the
63. Id. at 465–66 (citation omitted).
64. Id. at 471.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“To my mind the proper line of approach in
determining whether to apply a state or federal rule, whether ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural,’ is to
stay close to basic principles by inquiring if the choice of rule would substantially affect those
primary decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state
regulation.”).
67. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
68. See id. at 749 (“Application of the Hanna analysis is premised on a ‘direct collision’
between the Federal Rule and the state law.”)
69. The Court characterized the state law as “a statement of a substantive decision by the state
that actual service on . . . the defendant is an integral part of the several policies served by the
statute of limitations.” Id. at 751.
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Court in Walker asked whether the state law in question was substantive
in order to decide whether it conflicted with the Federal Rule. 70 Walker
did not, however, present this approach—involving characterization of
both state and federal law—as required.
In its next major Erie decision, Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v.
Woods, the Court reverted to the Hanna focus on the validity of any
pertinent federal rule. 71 The rationale for the decision suggested an
“incidental effects” or “relaxed separation” approach to Erie analysis, 72
reconceiving characterization along functionalist lines to accommodate
the possibility of substantive-procedural overlap. But this approach did
not solve the puzzles introduced by Walker: in what types of cases
should a court consider not only the procedural character of the federal
rule, but also the substantive character of the state rule? And can a
substantive state rule ever “collide” with a procedural federal rule?
The discontinuous nature of the decisions issued during this period
gave commentators ample opportunity to suggest unifying principles. A
prominent 1980 law review article described the Erie doctrine as the
“most studied principle in American law.” 73 Much of this commentary
continued the tradition of skepticism about formal substantiveprocedural distinctions. 74 Toward the end of the 1980s, the discussion
70. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 752 (concluding that the state law at issue was substantive and did
not conflict with the Federal Rule).
71. In Burlington, the Court unanimously held that Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which gives courts of appeals “plenary discretion to assess ‘just damages’ . . . [on] an
appellant who takes a frivolous appeal,” should be applied in federal court in preference to a state
statute requiring appellate courts to assess a fixed penalty on certain appeals. 480 U.S. 1, 7
(1987).
72. Justice Marshall’s opinion explained that “[r]ules which incidentally affect litigants’
substantive rights do not violate . . . [the REA] if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of
that system of rules.” Id. at 5. The approach has been both praised for its sensitivity to the
purposes of the REA, Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the
Procedural-Substantive Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 32
(2008), and criticized for its expansiveness, Kurt M. Saunders, Plying the Erie Waters: Choice of
Law in the Deterrence of Frivolous Appeals, 21 GA. L. REV. 653, 714 (1987).
73. Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie after the Death of Diversity?, 78
MICH. L. REV. 311, 312 (1980).
74. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 23, at 372, 376, 378 (“The use of a procedural
categorization . . . makes the outcome of a case depend not on thorough analysis, but rather on a
single bipolar inquiry which must necessarily be artificial and inaccurate.”); Scott M. Matheson,
Jr., Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact on the First Amendment, 66 TEX.
L. REV. 215, 223 (1987) (“To speak of procedural and substantive rules as if each can be defined
independently of the other is inaccurate. Law is the product of an interaction between substance
and procedure.”); Saunders, supra note 72, at 692–93 (“Substance, like procedure, is an
amorphous concept incapable of an all-inclusive definition.”). Some writers continued to criticize
formalistic approaches to characterization. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 23, at 376, 378 (“To
attempt to maintain a traditional substance-procedure distinction in the midst of a modern choice
of law method[] has been rejected by virtually every scholar, court and legal committee which has
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became increasingly critical. Erie doctrine was seen as not just
intellectually dissatisfying but also sowing inconsistency 75 and chaos in
the federal courts. 76 Scholars did not, however, converge on a common
framework for distinguishing substantive from procedural rules. 77 The
next phase of Supreme Court decisions seemed to amplify this
cacophony.

considered the issue.”). Many noted how a wide variety of rules—including rules of evidence,
statutes of limitations, pleading rules, and fee-shifting provisions—cannot be accounted for by a
one-size-fits-all approach to substantive-procedural distinctions.
On rules of evidence, see, for example, Bishop, supra note 37 (criticizing formalist
approaches); Lindsey C. Boney IV, Note, Forum Shopping through the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 60 ALA. L. REV. 151 (2008) (same); Dickey, supra note 37, at 122 (same); Lanstra,
supra note 37, at 858, 875 (same); Lawson, supra note 37, at 551–53 (same); Richard Henry
Seamon, An Erie Obstacle to State Tort Reform, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 91–92 (2006) (same); Olin
Guy Wellborn III, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of State Law in the Federal
Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371, 396 (1977) (“[S]tate courts not infrequently phrase rulings in terms
of evidence law that in fact are decisions about substantive law.”).
On statutes of limitations, see, for example, Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure”
in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 290–91, 295 (discussing various possible
characterizations of statutes of limitations); Craft, supra note 23 (same); Richard D. Freer, Erie’s
Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1102–03 (1989) (same).
For pleading rules, see, for example, Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the
Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 59 (1998) (noting that
“[p]leading is quintessentially procedural,” but “the impact of relaxed pleading requirements on
substantive outcomes is apparent”); Jeffrey A. Parness, Amy M. Leonetti & Austin W. Bartlett,
The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleading Laws, 78 NEB. L. REV. 412, 439–41
(1999) (making a similar observation).
For fee-shifting provisions, see, for example, Jeffrey A. Parness, Choices About Attorney FeeShifting Laws: Further Substance/Procedure Problems Under Erie and Elsewhere, 49 U. PITT. L.
REV. 393, 399, 401, 442 (1988) (“[A] court can characterize a single fee-shifting provision as
either procedural or substantive, depending upon the setting.”).
For an argument that all procedural rules have a substantive dimension, and vice versa, see
Main, supra note 17.
75. Freer, supra note 74, at 1090.
76. Darrel N. Braman, Jr. & Mark D. Neumann, The Still Unrepressed Myth of Erie, 18 U.
BALT. L. REV. 403, 474 (1989).
77. Suggestions from commentators included identifying procedural rules as those “designed
to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes,”
Ely, supra note 40, at 724; identifying procedural rules as those that “control[] the conduct of
litigation” and substantive rules as those that “control[] social conduct outside the courtroom,”
Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE
L.J. 718, 721–22 (1975); identifying substantive rules as those having a nonprocedural purpose or
“calculated to affect behavior at the planning stage as distinguished from the disputation stage of
activity,” Wellborn, supra note 74, at 404; identifying procedural rules as those that “refer[] to the
way legal disputes are resolved in court,” but noting four distinct senses in which a rule may be
“substantive,” Westen & Lehman, supra note 73, at 360–62; and identifying substantive rules as
those identifying “legal rights to be applied” and procedural rules as those that “structure the
process for laying claim to such rights,” Note, The Conflict Between Rule 68 and the Civil Rights
Attorneys’ Fees Statute: Reinterpreting the Rules Enabling Act, 98 HARV. L. REV. 828, 832–35
(1985) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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D. Phase Three: The Court Takes Up the Struggle (1996–Present)
Since the 1990s, the Court has experimented with a variety of
approaches to Erie issues, drawing on models from every earlier period
without settling on a scheme satisfying a majority of Justices.
Academic commentary has grown ever more critical, but most recently
appears, unfortunately, to have renounced earlier skepticism about the
virtues of a formalist approach to characterization.
Skepticism of this kind has, however, been one of the few constants
in the Court’s recent Erie decisions. In the 1996 case, Gasperini v.
Center for the Humanities, the Court engineered a delicate compromise
between state and federal law. 78 The case presented the question of
whether federal courts were required to follow a state statute
empowering appellate courts to order new trials when jury awards
“deviate[] materially from what would be reasonable compensation.”79
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, explained that while the
Seventh Amendment’s reexamination clause prohibited federal
appellate courts from obeying this command, federal district courts
could pursue the policy expressed in the statute. 80 Her analysis did not,
however, track any substantive-procedural distinction. Indeed, she
explained, characterization could not decide the case because the state
statute at issue was “both ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’: ‘substantive’
in that [its] ‘deviates materially’ standard controls how much a plaintiff
can be awarded; ‘procedural’ in that [it] assigns decision-making
authority to [the state] Appellate Division.” 81 Justices Stevens and
Scalia both dissented, objecting to this analysis for contrary reasons.
Justice Stevens considered the substantive objective of the state statute
to be controlling. 82 But Justice Scalia viewed the provision as entirely
procedural, while suggesting that the substantive-procedural distinction
was a distraction from the more basic distinction between a “rule of
law” and a “rule of review.” 83 Justice Scalia also saw the case as
78. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
79. Id. at 418–19.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 426. Later in the opinion, Justice Ginsburg again described the state statute as both
substantive and procedural: “[The state statute] contains a procedural instruction . . . but the
State’s objective is manifestly substantive.” Id. at 429.
82. See id. at 447 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s persuasive demonstration that New
York law sets forth a substantive limitation on the size of jury awards seems to refute the
contention that New York has merely asked appellate courts to reexamine facts [a procedural
request]. The majority’s analysis thus would seem to undermine the conclusion that the
Reexamination Clause is relevant to this case.”).
83. Id. at 464–65 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia continued:
A tighter standard for reviewing jury determinations can no more plausibly be called a
“substantive” disposition than can a tighter appellate standard for reviewing trial-court
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demanding the type of analysis used in Hanna and Burlington
Northern. 84 Gasperini thus revealed considerable disagreement among
the Justices about the importance and proper structuring of
characterization decisions. 85
Reaching agreement on these questions was not on the Court’s
agenda in Semtek v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 86 the next major decision
addressing the validity of a federal rule and the choice between state and
federal law. Semtek raised the issue of whether “the claim preclusive
effect of a federal judgment dismissing a diversity action on statute-oflimitations grounds is determined by the law of the State in which the
[dismissing] federal court sits.” 87 Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice Scalia concluded that judgments dismissing claims under Rule
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not have such
preclusive status; a contrary conclusion, the opinion suggested, might be
foreclosed by the REA. 88 This analysis implied that one attribute of
“procedural” rules might be their narrow scope of application—the
limited number of people and institutions bound by their commands.
The Semtek opinion also noted the “substantive” character of the state
law of claim preclusion at issue. 89 But it provided no further guidance
determinations. The one, like the other, provides additional assurance that the law has
been complied with [and is therefore procedural]; but the other, like the one, leaves the
law unchanged.
Id. at 465.
84. See id. at 467–68 (“[I]n my view, one does not even reach the Erie question in this case.
The standard to be applied by a district court in ruling on a motion for a new trial is set forth in
Rule 59 . . . . That is undeniably a federal standard. . . . It is simply not possible to give
controlling effect both to the federal standard and the state standard in reviewing the jury’s award.
That being so, one has no choice but to apply the Federal Rule.”).
85. Not surprisingly, commentators criticized Gasperini for reimposing a “case-specific and
issue-specific approach to balancing.” Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 16, 20 (2006). See also Hendricks, supra note 10, at 125–26 (listing praise and criticism
of the case-specific approach to Erie).
86. 531 U.S. 497 (2001). In 2010, Jeffrey Cooper described this case as “still . . . the Court’s
most recent authoritative guidance as to how to assess a Federal Rule’s validity under the
[Enabling Act].” Jeffrey O. Cooper, Summary Judgment in the Shadow of Erie, 43 AKRON L.
REV. 1245, 1263 (2010).
87. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 499.
88. See id. at 503–04 (“[I]t would be peculiar to find a rule governing the effect that must be
accorded federal judgments by other courts ensconced in rules governing the [federal] procedures
of the rendering court itself. Indeed, such a rule would arguably violate the jurisdictional
limitation of the Rules Enabling Act . . . . In the present case, for example, if California law left
petitioner free to sue on his claim in Maryland even after the California statute of limitations had
expired, the federal court’s extinguishment of that right (through Rule 41(b)’s mandated claimpreclusive effect of its judgment) would seem to violate this limitation.”). See infra note 311
(discussing the consequences of jurisdictional characterization).
89. Id. at 508 (“Since state, rather than federal, substantive law is at issue there is no need for
a uniform federal rule.”).
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on the factors courts should consider in deciding a particular rule’s
character, and Justice Scalia did not mention whether his Gasperini
distinction between rules of law and rules of review applied to the
question.
Nor did this distinction play any role in Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, Inc. v. Allstate
Insurance Co., the first Supreme Court decision since Burlington
Northern to involve a traditional Erie question. 90 As noted above,
Shady Grove required the Court to decide whether a New York state
statute prohibiting class actions in suits seeking certain remedies
(section 901(b)) 91 barred a federal court in New York from certifying a
class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 92 In his
opinion, Justice Scalia stressed that section 901(b) directly conflicted
with Rule 23. 93 Under Hanna, the presence of this conflict barred the
federal court from applying section 901(b)—as long as Rule 23 was
procedural and therefore valid (an issue on which all of the Justices
agreed). 94 Justice Scalia justified his finding of a direct conflict in part
by rebutting the arguments advanced by Justice Ginsburg in dissent that
section 901(b) had substantive purposes—the protection of certain
vulnerable defendants—and thus could not conflict with Rule 23. 95
Justice Ginsburg’s focus on the New York legislature’s “intentions,”
Justice Scalia argued, was misguided and unworkable. 96 Moreover,
90.
91.
92.
93.

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 2010).
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436.
Id. at 1438. The majority opinion continued:
[Section] 901(b)’s rule barring class actions for certain claims is set off as its own
subsection, and where it applies § 901(a) [permitting class certification in situations
analogous to those provided for in Rule 23] does not. This shows, according to
Allstate [the party arguing for application of § 901(b)], that § 901(b) concerns a
separate subject. Perhaps it does concern a subject separate from the subject of
§ 901(a). But the question before us is whether it concerns a subject separate from the
subject of Rule 23—and for purposes of answering that question the way New York
has structured its statute is immaterial.
Id. at 1438–39.
94. See id. at 1442–44; id. at 1457–60 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (finding that, because Rule 23 permits plaintiffs to join separate claims against the
same defendants in a class action, the Rule is procedural and therefore valid); id. at 1466–68
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that Rule 23 regulates procedural aspects of class litigation).
95. Id. at 1439–42.
96. See id. at 1440–41 (“The dissent’s approach of determining whether state and federal rules
conflict based on the subjective intentions of the state legislature is an enterprise destined to
produce ‘confusion worse confounded.’ It would mean . . . that district courts would have to
discern, in every diversity case, the purpose behind any putatively pre-empted state procedural
rule, even if its text squarely conflicts with federal law. That task will often prove arduous.
Many laws further more than one aim, and the aim of others may be impossible to discern.
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Justice Scalia maintained, substantive-procedural characterization is
simply irrelevant to the initial question of conflict under Hanna, 97 and
the characterization of state laws as substantive or procedural is also
irrelevant to Erie analysis in cases involving Federal Rules. 98 Only “the
substantive or procedural nature of the Federal Rule” is relevant. 99 It
may not be surprising that Justice Scalia traced what he considers to be
the only relevant characterization issue to the textual requirements of
the REA: “The statute itself refers to ‘substantive right[s],’ . . . so there
is no escaping the substance-procedure distinction.” 100
The last component of Justice Scalia’s relatively formalist analysis—
that a court making an Erie decision should focus on characterizing only
the federal rule under consideration—was one of the main issues
dividing the majority from the concurring and dissenting Justices.
Justice Stevens’s concurrence agreed that section 901(b) was “a
procedural rule,” but also agreed with Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting
position that “there are some state procedural rules that federal courts
must apply in diversity cases because they function as part of the state’s
definition of substantive rights and remedies.” 101 For Justice Stevens, a
federal rule cannot be characterized definitively without also
considering the character of any state rules whose operation the federal
rule might affect. That consideration, however, should ask not whether
the state rules are “substantive,” but “whether the state law actually is
part of a State’s framework of rights and remedies.” 102 This departure
Moreover, to the extent the dissent’s purpose-driven approach depends on its characterization of
§ 901(b)’s aims as substantive, it would apply to many state rules ostensibly addressed to
procedure. . . . It is not even clear that a state supreme court’s pronouncement of the law’s
purpose would settle the issue, since existence of the factual predicate for avoiding federal preemption is ultimately a federal question.” (citation omitted)).
97. See id. at 1442 (“Erie involved the constitutional power of federal courts to supplant state
law with judge-made rules. In that context, it made no difference whether the rule was
technically one of substance or procedure; the touchstone was whether it ‘significantly affect[s]
the result of a litigation.’” (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 236 U.S. 99, 109 (1945))).
98. See id. at 1443–44 (“[T]he substantive nature of New York’s law, or its substantive
purpose, makes no difference. A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is not valid in some
jurisdictions and invalid in others—or valid in some cases and invalid in others—depending upon
whether its effect is to frustrate a state substantive law (or a state procedural rule enacted for
substantive purposes).”).
99. Id. at 1443–44. Although he explicitly denied the need to characterize state law, Justice
Scalia did liken the state law at issue to other provisions he appeared to consider indisputably
procedural. See id. at 1443 (“[Section] 901(b) is no different from a state law forbidding simple
joinder.”).
100. Id. at 1447.
101. Id. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
102. Id. at 1449–50 (“[T]he balance Congress has struck [in the REA] turns, in part, on the
nature of the state law that is being displaced by a federal rule. And in my view, the application
of that balance does not necessarily turn on whether the state law at issue takes the form of what
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from the language of substantive-procedural characterization suggests
skepticism about the ease of distinguishing substantive from procedural
rules. 103 Still, Justice Stevens ultimately agreed with the result of
Justice Scalia’s analysis in Shady Grove, concluding that section 901(b)
was not “so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to
define the scope of the state right.” 104
Justice Ginsburg also considered the character of section 901(b), but
reached a different conclusion. She agreed with Justice Stevens that
federal courts deciding Erie cases should characterize both federal and
putatively conflicting state rules 105 and criticized the majority’s
approach as “mechanical, . . . insensitive to state rules[,] and productive
of discord.” 106 Justice Ginsburg further argued that section 901(b)
could only be understood as “a means to a manifestly substantive end:
Limiting a defendant’s liability in a single lawsuit to prevent the
exorbitant inflation of penalties.” 107 In light of this purpose of the
provision, it was irrelevant that section 901(b) appeared alongside
otherwise procedural statutes in the New York Code. 108 Furthermore,
given this characterization of section 901(b), no conflict could exist
between it and Rule 23, whose procedural character was undisputed. 109
Finally, the substantive character of section 901(b) dictated that it must
is traditionally described as substantive or procedural. . . . [I]t turns on whether the state law
actually is part of a State’s framework of substantive rights or remedies.”).
103. Id. Accordingly, Justice Stevens proposed a framework for Erie analysis focusing not
primarily on conflict, like Hanna, but on the function of the state law at issue: “A federal rule . . .
cannot govern a particular case in which the rule would displace a state law that is procedural in
the ordinary [sense] of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions
to define the scope of the [state right].” Id. at 1452. This framework, he contended, was more
consistent than Justice Scalia’s with the REA itself. See id. at 1454 (“The question . . . is not
what rule we think would be easiest in federal courts. The question is what rule Congress
established. Although[] Justice Scalia may generally prefer easily administrable, bright-line
rules, his preference does not give us license to adopt a second-best interpretation of the Rules
Enabling Act.”).
104. Id. at 1452. Justice Stevens continued: “The text of CPLR § 901(b) expressly and
unambiguously applies not only to claims based on New York law but also to claims based on
federal law or the law of any other State. And there is no interpretation from New York courts to
the contrary. It is therefore hard to see how § 901(b) could be understood as a rule that, though
procedural in form, serves the function of defining New York’s rights or remedies.” Id. at 1457.
105. Id. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1463–64.
107. Id. at 1465.
108. See id. at 1469 (“Placement in the CPLR is hardly dispositive. The provision held
‘substantive’ for Erie purposes in Gasperini is also contained in the CPLR . . . , as are limitations
periods, prescriptions plainly ‘substantive’ for Erie purposes however they may be characterized
for other purposes.” (citations omitted)).
109. See id. at 1465 (accepting for purposes of analysis the majority’s refusal to find Rule 23
invalid); discussion supra note 94 (establishing that all the justices in Shady Grove agreed Rule
23 was procedural and valid).
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prevail, rather than Rule 23, despite the validity of the Federal Rule. 110
The three Shady Grove opinions thus proposed three frameworks for
Erie analysis using characterization in completely different ways.
Justice Scalia would only characterize federal rules in order to
determine their validity. Justice Ginsburg would characterize the state
law, as well, in order to determine the existence of a conflict and the
applicability of the RDA. Justice Stevens also would examine both
federal and state rules, but instead of characterizing the state rule, would
subject it to an “intertwined remedy” analysis. Each of these
approaches finds support in precedent. 111 As Shady Grove illustrated,
however, each might also support different conclusions in the same
case.
E. The Current Status of Substantive-Procedural Characterization
The discord apparent in Shady Grove has prompted a small but
passionate chorus of criticism. 112 Academic recommendations might in
fact be partly responsible for the lack of judicial consensus on the role
of characterization in Erie analysis. That is, it might be that the Justices
have not ignored the suggestions of commentators, but taken them too
much to heart—without being able to integrate these suggestions
satisfactorily with their preexisting methodological and doctrinal
commitments.
Both Justice Scalia’s limiting of characterization to federal law, and
Justice Stevens’s reframing of state law characterization as “intertwined
remedy” analysis, speak to the continued influence of Cook’s realist
argument and the skepticism to which it leads. 113 But each of the three
110. See id. at 1471 (“Shady Grove’s effort to characterize § 901(b) as simply ‘procedural’
cannot successfully elide this fundamental norm: When no federal law or rule is dispositive of an
issue, and a state statute is outcome affective in the sense our cases on Erie . . . develop, the Rules
of Decision Act commands application of the State’s law . . . .”).
111. Commentators have perceived tension between Shady Grove and other cases, especially
Sibbach. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (describing criticism of Shady Grove for its
failure to clarify an already criticized area of law). Justice Stevens disagreed that the issue in
Shady Grove resembled that in Sibbach. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1455 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment).
112. See generally, e.g, Burbank & Wolff, supra note 10 (presenting generally critical
reactions and recommending an alternative analysis); Hendricks, supra note 10 (presenting a new
level of Erie critique by analyzing Shady Grove); Tidmarsh, supra note 10 (arguing that the
bifurcated approach to Erie issues is flawed).
113. A skeptical position remains popular among some commentators. See, e.g., Burbank &
Wolff, supra note 10, at 30, 47 (noting the possibility that the meaning of “procedure” changes
over time along with “our understanding of what it means to have legal rights” and of “what in
the legal landscape . . . determines whether citizens will be able to fructify their legal rights”);
Kelleher, supra note 74, at 62–69 (noting that the substance-procedure distinction has proven
ineffective in defining the roles of the legislature and the court because both legislative
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Shady Grove opinions also insists on the need for a structured analysis
to ensure predictability. This goal echoes the concerns of recent
commentators, who have continued to criticize Erie doctrine as
unpredictable 114 and as reflecting, among other things, an insufficiently
crisp understanding of the distinction between substantive and
procedural rules. 115
These commentators have recognized the
continued importance of characterization but have struggled, like the
Justices, to pinpoint the role it should play in Erie analysis. When they
provide explicit recommendations, their proposals tend toward the
formalist—urging a search for “a single answer that explain[s] the
Court’s intuitions about when a federal court must strive to achieve the
outcome that a state court would have achieved,” 116 and advocating a
“single-dimensional” understanding of the substantive-procedural
distinction, under which each “legal rule should be classified as either
black or white: either substantive or procedural.” 117 Yet many

enactments and court rules contain elements of substance and procedure); David Marcus, The
Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
371, 401–02 (2010) (“From the debut of the Federal Rules until the 1970s . . . , Cook’s take on
the shadowy divide between substance and procedure prevailed as accepted wisdom.”); Hiroshi
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive
Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1628 (1992) (“[A]ny marginal statute . . . can be
made to appear ‘procedural’ by means of a simple rhetorical device.”); Linda S. Mullenix, The
Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 618
(1997) (“Neither the Supreme Court . . . nor academic exegesis over five decades has cogently
illuminated how best to determine whether a rule is ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural.’”).
114. Commentators have described the doctrine as a “complex and dubiously predictable
group of choice of law principles,” John A. Lynch, Jr., Federal Procedure and Erie: Saving State
Litigation Reform through Comparative Impairment, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 283, 283–84 (2008),
beginning to “fray around the edges,” Justice Jack B. Jacobs, The Vanishing SubstanceProcedure Distinction in Contemporary Corporate Litigation: An Essay, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1, 2 (2007), and remaining “remarkably unsettled,” Wayne A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal
Courts, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1253 (2010). This is all despite the length of time the doctrine
has had to develop: “More than sixty years of . . . jurisprudence has yet to result in any clear
consensus on the distinction between substance and procedure.” Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural
Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 193 (2004). The doctrine “does not provide a clear analytical
pathway for assessing whether a particular rule . . . impermissibly crosses the line between the
procedural and substantive law.” Bishop, supra note 37, at 284. Under current doctrine,
characterization questions “lack a clear answer.” Tidmarsh, supra note 10, at 879.
115. See, e.g., C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc., 1997 BYU L. REV. 267, 270 (“[D]etermining the sense in which a state rule of
decision should be regarded as ‘substantive’ should be the critical determinant of whether a
competing federal rule should be applied.”).
116. Tidmarsh, supra note 10, at 904.
117. Hendricks, supra note 10, at 106–08. Hendricks argues that this approach would
advance “transparency” in legislative activity. Id. See Edward J. Janger, Virtual Territoriality,
48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 401, 429 (2010) (“[T]o the extent that one can identify ‘procedural’
rules and distinguish them from rules that are ‘substantive’ and prone to pernicious competition,
then it is possible to seek the benefits of a centralizing rule without fearing its costs.”).
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commentators are also unwilling to abandon entirely the more skeptical,
functionalist perspective inherited from Cook and earlier Erie doctrine:
what is needed, according to some, is simply to “revisit the line between
‘procedure’ and ‘substance’ in light of practical experience and
evolving legal norms.” 118
So far, commentators have ignored the possibility of making use of
the Court’s recent successful development of characterization doctrine
in the distinct legal area of jurisdictional rules. As the next Part will
explain, this development shows that it is possible for characterization
doctrine to be both sensitive to functionalist concerns and structured
enough to enjoy consensus. Pure formalism is not the only alternative
to realist skepticism.
II. CHARACTERIZATION TYPE TWO: JURISDICTIONALNONJURISDICTIONAL DISTINCTIONS
We can put Erie characterization into useful perspective by
considering the fortunes of characterization decisions in another area:
determinations of the character of certain litigation requirements,
including prerequisites to suit and appeal. Supreme Court decisions
addressing these issues make a number of distinctions among such
prerequisites, the most basic being the distinction between jurisdictional
and nonjurisdictional rules. A rule classified as jurisdictional will have
special attributes, such as nonwaivability and insusceptibility to judicial
modification, that nonjurisdictional rules largely lack; rules within the
nonjurisdictional category are sometimes also grouped into further
subcategories. These distinctions have proliferated in an astonishingly
short period of time—over just the past decade—yet have won more
consensus than any comparable approach to Erie characterization.
The contrasting development of these two areas of doctrine makes it
easy to overlook their fundamental similarities. Both types of
characterization range broadly over statutory and judge-made legal
rules. Thus, each borrows at times from rules of statutory interpretation
and the principles underlying those rules, while sometimes extending
these principles to situations not strictly involving statutory application
(though still involving interpretation, as discussed below). In both
areas, decision-makers also must consider issues of power allocation.
In the Erie context, judges confront the allocation of power between
state and federal lawmaking processes, as well as between legislatures
and courts. In the jurisdictional-rules context, they consider the
allocation of power between legislatures and courts as well as between
118. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 10, at 20.
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litigants and government institutions.
And in both areas of
characterization doctrine, with varying success, the Court has sought to
steer a middle course between the skeptical-functionalist insight that
characterization is ultimately an arbitrary exercise, at least in some
borderline cases, and the clarity and stability of categorical formalism.
A. Development of Jurisdictional-Characterization Doctrine:
An Overview
The most dramatic developments in the jurisdictionalcharacterization area are much more recent than in Erie doctrine.
Decisions setting forth guidelines for jurisdictional characterization
have proliferated over the past decade, and the past few years in
particular.
Students of this topic commonly credit the Supreme Court’s 1848
decision in United States v. Curry 119 with establishing most of the basic
principles. Curry articulated a firm distinction between jurisdictional
and other types of statutes and set forth the premise that the primary
source of power to establish jurisdictional rules of law is legislative. 120
The case addressed whether the Court had appellate jurisdiction over an
appeal taken pursuant to a district court order specifying a deadline for
notifying the appellees in the matter. Chief Justice Taney’s opinion for
the Court concluded that appellate jurisdiction was lacking because the
statute granting the Court jurisdiction over such appeals did not give
district courts power to control the terms or manner in which appeals
might occur:
The power to hear and determine a case like this is conferred upon the
Court by acts of Congress, and the same authority which gives the
jurisdiction has pointed out the manner in which the case shall be
brought before us; and we have no power to dispense with any of
these provisions, nor to change or modify them. 121

The links Curry established among the characterization of a rule as
jurisdictional, the presence or absence of judicial power, and the
enterprise of statutory application would reemerge and become more
complex in Supreme Court decisions issued after the year 2000.
For more than a century, however, jurisdictional characterization
received little further attention. In the last decades of the twentieth
century, a series of Supreme Court decisions, many written by Justice
Ginsburg, began to consider whether Federal Rule-based and non-time119. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106 (1848).
120. Robbins, supra note 15, at 288–89 (discussing the significance of Curry in the
development of jurisdictional doctrine).
121. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 113.
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limit statutory litigation requirements merit characterization as
jurisdictional. Early cases addressing these issues reached varying
conclusions, prompting an attempt by the Court to clarify the doctrine in
the mid-2000s, punctuated by the arguably anomalous Bowles v. Russell
decision in 2007. 122 Led by Justice Ginsburg and joined by a growing
group of her fellow Justices, the Court since Bowles has renewed its
efforts at doctrinal construction.
In this process, the Court has adopted several suggestions made by
academic commentators, who, like some of their counterparts writing on
Erie issues, have directly engaged with the skeptical-functionalist
critique of characterization to inform their suggestions regarding formal
doctrinal elaboration. 123 The options for jurisdictional-characterization
analysis have proliferated as a result. In commentary and opinions,
jurisdictional rules are sometimes simply opposed to nonjurisdictional
rules, 124 but sometimes they are opposed to rules governing the
“merits,” a category overlapping with the “substantive”; 125 sometimes
they are opposed to procedural rules 126 and sometimes to so-called
122. 551 U.S. 205 (2007). See infra Parts II.C and II.D (discussing the emergence of the
jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional distinction and the initial formalization of the jurisdictionalcharacterization doctrine).
123. See generally Dane, supra note 4 (arguing that the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is
a miscalculation due to the categorical distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional
rules); Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1 (2011)
[hereinafter Dodson, Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity] (discussing the lack of clarity within
jurisdictional doctrine due to the mistaken assumption that jurisdictional rules must be clear, and
arguing that clarity can be obtained to a certain degree, but at a price); Dodson, Hybridizing,
supra note 4 (arguing that jurisdictional rules can be “hybridized” with nonjurisdictional rules to
regulate federal jurisdiction in desirable ways); Lee, supra note 16 (arguing that conventional
thought on jurisdiction is misleading and dangerous).
124. See, e.g., Dane, supra note 4, at 5, 7 (stating that jurisdictional rules concern the power of
a tribunal and nonjurisdictional rules do not); Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and
Misuse, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2006) (“It is a basic axiom of American jurisprudence that
legal issues are classified as either ‘jurisdictional’ or ‘nonjurisdictional.’”).
125. See, e.g., Dane, supra note 4, at 42–44 (emphasizing how “jurisdictional issues
sometimes do touch matters of substance”); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?,
95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1207–09 (2001) (discussing characterization of jurisdictional issues in
contrast to “merits” issues); Lee, supra note 16, at 1613–14 (arguing, inter alia, that “there is no
hard conceptual difference between jurisdiction and the merits”); Wasserman, supra note 12, at
498 (distinguishing “adjudicative-jurisdictional rules” from both “substantive merits rules” and
“procedural, or ‘claim-processing,’ rules”). Sometimes, this distinction is expressed in terms of
H.L.A. Hart’s distinction between primary (substantive, merits-oriented) rules and secondary
(procedural, jurisdictional) rules, as in Wasserman, supra note 16, at 670–71. Cf. Jenny S.
Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1021
(2008) (“[M]y use of the terms ‘substance’ and ‘process’ roughly parallels H.L.A. Hart’s
distinction between primary and secondary rules.” (citing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
80–81 (2d ed. 1994)).
126. See, e.g., Dodson, Removal Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 59 (“[J]urisdiction is the power
or authority of a court to issue legitimate, binding, and enforceable orders. Procedure is the
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“claim-processing” rules. 127
Thus, depending on the context,
jurisdictional rules might be either second-order rules (rules governing
the application of first-order rules, which govern conduct) or third-order
rules (rules governing the application of both second- and first-order
rules). 128 In either case, however, the rules for deciding the character of
a particular rule are of an order higher than the rule whose character is
being decided: they are the rules for identifying the category in which to
place lower-order rules. This structural characteristic is common to
both substantive-procedural characterization and jurisdictional
characterization, yet the Court seems to have recognized it only in the
latter context. At this level, in the jurisdictional-characterization
context, the Court has achieved significantly more consensus than in the
context of substantive-procedural characterization.
B. Phase One: Emergence of the Issues (1960–2004)
The 1960 decision in United States v. Robinson laid the groundwork
for the Court’s early twenty-first-century development of jurisdictionalcharacterization doctrine. 129 Robinson extended the principles set out in
Curry to appeal-filing requirements set out in the Federal Rules rather
than in statutes, and held that “the filing of [a] notice of appeal within
the 10-day period prescribed by [Federal] Rule [of Appellate Procedure]
37(a)(2) is mandatory and jurisdictional.” 130 The Court explained its
determination by noting that all precursors to Rule 37(a)(2) had been
similarly understood to be “mandatory and jurisdictional, and appeals
not taken within [the specified time] appear always to have been
dismissed regardless of cause.” 131
regulation of that power or authority once obtained.”).
127. See, e.g., Perry A. Craft, Framed by the Times, 40 TENN. B.J. 18, 22 (2004)
(summarizing the distinction drawn in Kontrick v. Ryan between jurisdictional and claimprocessing rules); infra notes 144–47 and accompanying text (same).
128. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing how jurisdictional, or secondary,
rules can oppose substantive, or primary, rules).
129. 361 U.S. 220 (1960).
130. Id. at 224.
131. Id. at 227. In part, the analysis turned on the meaning not only of the time limit
prescribed in Rule 37(a)(2), but also of the power given to district courts by Rule 45(b), which
permits a court to “extend the time” within which “an act must or may be done within a specified
period.” The majority concluded that Rule 45 must be read to preclude an “extension” of time to
file a notice of appeal by district court order. Id. Justice Black, dissenting, contended that the
court of appeals in Robinson had been correct to hold that “an extension of time, granted after the
10-day period for an appeal has passed, is not an ‘enlargement’ of the time in the narrow sense in
which Rule 45(b) uses the word.” Id. at 230 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black’s analysis of
the issue using tools of statutory interpretation would come to be a typical approach in later
jurisdictional-characterization decisions. See infra Parts II.C–F (discussing the development of
the doctrine through its initial formalization, disruption, and subsequent revival).
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This approach to time limits set out in Federal Rules, relying largely
if not exclusively on precedent (that is, prior characterizations of similar
rules), remained the standard approach for most of the next few
decades. 132 (It resembled the approach Cook had criticized much
earlier in the conflicts area.) For example, in Browder v. Director,133
the Court held that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review an
order directing discharge of a habeas corpus petitioner from custody if
the appeal from the order was untimely under applicable Federal
Rules. 134 Justice Powell’s majority opinion pointed not just to
precedent, but also to the administrative difficulties and perceived
unfairness that might result from declining to characterize the time limit
under Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and 28
U.S.C. § 2107 as “mandatory and jurisdictional”: 135 “The confusion that
would result from litigants’ divergent views of the completeness of
proceedings would be wholly at odds with the imperative that
jurisdictional requirements be explicit and unambiguous.” 136
The Court found that precedent and practical consequences dictated a
different characterization conclusion in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,
decided in 1982. 137 In Zipes, the Court held that despite its statutory
status, the “time limit for filing charges under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act” was not a “jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit” in district
court. 138 The fact that the filing requirement appeared in a statute was
just the beginning of the inquiry in this case. Justice White’s opinion
analogized this statutory time limit to a (nonjurisdictional) “statute of
limitations”; considered “[t]he structure of Title VII, the congressional
policy underlying it, and the reasoning of our cases”; 139 and noted the
absence of any time limit in “[t]he provision granting district courts

132. Robbins, supra note 15, at 299.
133. 434 U.S. 257 (1978), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2245, as stated in Ukawabutu v.
Morton, 997 F. Supp. 605 (D.N.J. 1998).
134. Id. at 264–65.
135. Id. at 264. The two provisions both set out a thirty-day time limit.
136. Id. at 266–67. In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun warned against the “exalt[ation
of] nomenclature over substance,” but he was referring to the characterization of the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the district court’s order, not to the majority’s use of “mandatory
and jurisdictional” terminology. Id. at 272 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Later commentators
would come to consider the “mandatory and jurisdictional” term more problematic because of its
apparent formalism. See Dodson, Hybridizing, supra note 4, at 67–68 (noting that Congress
might intend statutory requirements to be mandatory without intending them to have other
jurisdictional attributes); Dodson, Mandatory, supra note 16 (presenting a framework for
distinguishing mandatoriness from other effects of jurisdictionality).
137. 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
138. Id. at 387, 393.
139. Id. at 393.
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jurisdiction under Title VII,” as well as the failure of the time limit
provision itself to “speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to
the jurisdiction of the district courts.” 140 The last of these points would
become especially influential in later jurisdictional-characterization
doctrines. Textual and practical considerations similarly oriented the
Court’s analysis in Becker v. Montgomery, decided in 2001. Justice
Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Becker held that an appellant’s failure to
sign a notice of appeal did not deprive the federal appellate court of
jurisdiction over the appeal, at least if “the appellant promptly
supplie[d] the signature once the omission [wa]s called to his
attention.” 141 Justice Ginsburg denied any intention to overrule
precedent that had described Rule 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure (prescribing requirements for an effective notice of
appeal) as “jurisdictional in nature.” 142 Rather, she argued that the
particular mistake committed by this appellant should not be treated as
equivalent to noncompliance with these slightly different requirements,
in the absence of a specific statutory reference and in light of the drastic
consequences of a contrary conclusion.
By the time of Becker, the Court had thus begun to distinguish among
pre-litigation requirements based not only on the authority issuing the
particular requirement and on prior characterizations of that
requirement, but also on specific features of the legal sources containing
the requirement, and on the systemic implications of particular
characterization decisions. As in the contemporary Erie context, the
Court tended in its decisions to deny that it was departing from
precedent, while sometimes reaching conclusions difficult to reconcile
with prior cases.
While a few commentators noted these
inconsistencies, they, unlike the Court’s Erie decision, did not inspire
wide criticism. 143
140. Id. at 393–94.
141. Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 760 (2001). The signature requirement in this
case was supplied by a local rule. Id. at 765.
142. Id. at 765–66. Justice Ginsburg wrote:
We rule simply . . . that Becker’s lapse was curable as Civil Rule 11(a) prescribes; his
initial omission was not a “jurisdictional” impediment to pursuit of his appeal.
Appellate Rules 3 and 4 . . . are indeed linked jurisdictional provisions. . . . Notably, a
signature requirement is not among Rule 3(c)(1)’s specifications, for Civil Rule 11(a)
alone calls for and controls that requirement and renders it nonjurisdictional.
Id.
143. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV.
399, 399–400 (1986) (contending that “[t]he appellate courts have made a fetish of their own
authority by characterizing defects in notices of appeal as ‘jurisdictional’” and arguing against
this use of the term); see generally Dane, supra note 4 (exploring recent irregularities in courts’
descriptions of requirements as “jurisdictional”).
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C. Phase Two: Initial Formalization (2004–2007)
In the mid-2000s, the Court began trying to tidy up its jurisdictionalcharacterization doctrine through a straightforward program of
disciplining the use of characterization labels. In Kontrick v. Ryan,
decided in 2004, Justice Ginsburg presented the first statement of this
program:
Courts, including this Court, . . . have been less than meticulous [in
their use of the term “jurisdictional”]; they have more than
occasionally used the term . . . to describe emphatic time prescriptions
in rules of court. “Jurisdiction,” the Court has aptly observed, is a
word of many, too many, meanings . . . . Classifying time
prescriptions, even rigid ones, under the heading “subject matter
jurisdiction” can be confounding. . . . Clarity would be facilitated if
courts and litigants used the label “jurisdictional” not for claimprocessing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of
cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal
jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority. 144

On this premise, the Court characterized Rule 4004 of the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure (which set a time limit for filing a plea
objecting to a debtor’s discharge petition) as “claim-processing” rather
than jurisdictional, and therefore forfeited as a basis for defense to such
a plea if not timely raised. 145 However, while Kontrick clearly
specified two distinct categories of rules (jurisdictional versus claimprocessing), it did not describe any standards for identifying rules that
might qualify as jurisdictional, beyond noting that such rules
“delineat[e] . . . classes of cases . . . or persons.” 146 The petitioner in
Kontrick had conceded that Rule 4004 did not relate to subject-matter
jurisdiction, making it unnecessary for Justice Ginsburg to analyze the
features of the Rule that justified placing it in the “claim-processing”
category. 147
Later in 2004, Justice Ginsburg provided further guidance in
Scarborough v. Principi. 148 In Principi, the Court characterized a
statutory filing time limit (for a fee application under the Equal Access
to Justice Act) as nonjurisdictional, explaining that the time limit did
“not concern the federal courts’ ‘subject-matter jurisdiction,’” but rather
involved “a mode of relief . . . ancillary to the judgment of a court that
has plenary ‘jurisdiction of the [civil] action’ in which the fee
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

540 U.S. 443, 454–55 (2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at 447.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 454–55.
541 U.S. 401 (2004).
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application is made.” 149 Borrowing language from Kontrick, Justice
Ginsburg looked to the content of the statutory provision at issue to
justify this characterization: because the statute “does not describe what
‘classes of cases’ . . . the [Court of Veterans Claims] is competent to
adjudicate,” “the provision’s 30-day deadline for fee applications and its
application-content
specifications
are
not
properly
typed
‘jurisdictional.’” 150
The Court also refused to apply the “jurisdictional” term to
provisions failing to describe “classes of cases” in two more cases over
the next two years: Eberhart v. United States, 151 a per curiam opinion,
and Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 152 authored by Justice Ginsburg. In
Eberhart, the Court held that the seven-day limit on motions for new
trials in Rule 33(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 153 did
not bar a motion for a new trial made outside that period, if the
opposing party did not raise the issue of the motion’s timeliness until
appeal. 154 The Court analyzed the issue as indistinguishable from that
in Kontrick 155 and explained that Kontrick itself had been consistent
with the Court’s 1960 decision in Robinson. That earlier case, the Court
explained, had concerned the judicial duty to apply statutes according to
their terms, not according to the labeling of particular provisions:
Robinson has created some confusion because of its observation that
“courts have uniformly held that the taking of an appeal within the
prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdictional.” The resulting
imprecision has obscured the central point of the Robinson case—that
when the Government objected to a filing untimely under Rule 37, the
Court’s duty to dismiss the appeal was mandatory. 156

149. Id. at 413.
150. Id. at 414.
151. 546 U.S. 12 (2005) (per curiam).
152. 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
153. The Rule contains an exception for motions based on newly discovered evidence. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a).
154. Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 13.
155. See id. at 15–16 (“The Rules we construed in Kontrick closely parallel those at issue
here. . . . It is implausible that the Rules considered in Kontrick can be nonjurisdictional claimprocessing rules, while virtually identical provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure can
deprive federal courts of their subject-matter jurisdiction. . . . Moreover, the most recent
decisions have attempted to brush away confusion introduced by our earlier decisions. . . . We
break no new ground in firmly classifying Rules 33 and 45 as claim-processing rules, despite the
confusion generated by the ‘less than meticulous’ uses of the term ‘nonjurisdictional’ in our
earlier cases.”).
156. Id. at 17–18 (citing United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). See id. at 19
(“Our repetition of the phrase ‘mandatory and jurisdictional’ has understandably led the lower
courts to err on the side of caution by giving the limitations in Rules 33 and 45 the force of
subject-matter jurisdiction.”).
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In Arbaugh, Justice Ginsburg further developed a set of rules for
structuring characterization decisions. In this case, the Court held that
the statutory requirement that a defendant in a Title VII action have
fifteen or more employees to qualify as an “employer” “does not
circumscribe federal subject-matter jurisdiction” but rather “relates to
the substantive adequacy of . . . [a] Title VII claim.” 157 Justice
Ginsburg noted that the Court had been “less than meticulous” about the
distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and the substantive
requirements of a claim, just as it had been about the analogous
jurisdiction/claim-processing distinction:
Subject-matter jurisdiction in federal-question cases is sometimes
erroneously conflated with a plaintiff’s need and ability to prove the
defendant is bound by the federal law asserted as the predicate for
relief—a merits-related determination.” Judicial opinions . . . “often
obscure the issue by stating that the court is dismissing ‘for lack of
jurisdiction’ when some threshold fact has not been established,
without explicitly considering whether the dismissal should be for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim.” We have
described such unrefined distinctions as “drive-by jurisdictional
rulings” that should be accorded “no precedential effect” on the
question whether the federal court had authority to adjudicate the
claim in suit. 158

Recalling the 1982 analysis of Title VII characterization decision in
Zipes, 159 and picking up on a hint in Justice Black’s dissent in
Robinson, 160 Justice Ginsburg encouraged courts to ground their
characterization of statutory requirements in close analysis of the
statutes at issue. In the provision disputed in Arbaugh, “[n]othing in the
text of Title VII indicate[d] that Congress intended courts, on their own
motion, to assure that the employee-numerosity requirement [wa]s
met.” 161 Although “Congress could make the employee-numerosity
requirement ‘jurisdictional,’” it had not explicitly done so; the
requirement did not appear in the “jurisdictional” provision of Title VII
authorizing federal district courts to decide claims under the statute.162
Rather, “the 15-employee threshold appear[ed] in a separate provision
that ‘d[id] not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the
157. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503–04.
158. Id. at 511 (citing 2 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 12.30[1], at 1236.1 (3d ed. 2005)); Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 2000); Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 139–40 (describing statutory analysis in Zipes).
160. See supra note 131 (describing Justice Black’s construction of Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure 37(a)(2) and 45(b)).
161. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514.
162. Id. at 514–15.
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jurisdiction of the district courts.’” 163 Without disavowing the concern
for precedent displayed in Zipes and Eberhart, Arbaugh implied that
characterization questions should be treated as essentially issues of
statutory interpretation, at least when statutory requirements are at
issue. 164
D. Phase Three: The Bowles Disruption (2007)
Until the Arbaugh decision, the Court—especially Justice
Ginsburg—seemed to be developing a characterization doctrine along a
coherent (if not yet comprehensive) trajectory. The Court’s next
decision in this area departed from the pattern, confounding
observers. 165 In 2007, one year after Arbaugh, the Court decided
Bowles v. Russell, which held that a time limit prescribed in a Federal
Rule and a parallel statute was jurisdictional, apparently merely because
it was a time limit. 166 Justice Thomas’s majority opinion noted that the
Court had “long held that the taking of an appeal within the prescribed
time limit is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional,’” 167 and that none of its
recent characterization decisions (such as Kontrick and Arbaugh) had
overridden the “longstanding treatment of statutory time limits for
taking an appeal as jurisdictional.” 168 Justice Thomas did, however,
seek to show that the decision fit within the scheme Justice Ginsburg
had been developing in recent cases: “[T]he notion of ‘subject-matter’
jurisdiction . . . is no less ‘jurisdictional’ when Congress forbids federal
courts from adjudicating an otherwise legitimate ‘class of cases’ after a
certain period has elapsed from final judgment.” 169
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter argued that the Court’s
attempt to reconcile Bowles with precedent was no more than a gesture.
It made little sense, he contended, to characterize statutory time limits
as “jurisdictional” per se, without regard to the indicia of legislative
purpose used to characterize other statutory litigation prerequisites. 170
163. Id. at 515 (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982)).
164. See id. at 516 (“[W]hen Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.”).
165. See discussion infra notes 172–173 (discussing how Bowles v. Russell further
complicated the doctrine of jurisdiction).
166. 551 U.S. 205, 206–07 (2007). More specifically, the Court held that a notice of appeal
that was untimely under a federal rule and statute imposing parallel requirements could not confer
appellate jurisdiction over the appeal, even if the appeal was timely under a district court order
extending the time to file. Id. at 213–14.
167. Id. at 209.
168. Id. at 210–11.
169. Id. at 213 (internal citations omitted).
170. See id. at 218 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“A filing deadline is the paradigm of a claimprocessing rule, not of a delineation of cases that federal courts may hear, and so it falls outside

ARTICLES_4_PETROSKI.DOCX

2012]

11/6/2012 11:34 AM

Statutory Genres

225

Commentators echoed Justice Souter’s judgment that Bowles “le[ft] the
Court incoherent.” 171 The decision was seen as making “a mess of the
doctrine of jurisdiction and the idea of jurisdictionality” and a
“conceptual muddle of the received wisdom on jurisdictional time
limits.” 172 It “overstated the supporting precedent, inflated the
jurisdictional importance of statutes, and undermined an important
recent movement to clarify when a rule is jurisdictional and when it is
not.” 173
The following year, in John R. Sand & Gravel v. United States, the
Court recognized “jurisdictional” attributes in another statutory time
limit. 174 The statute in question governed the timeliness of lawsuits
filed in the Court of Federal Claims. 175 As in Bowles, the majority
looked largely to precedent, 176 but it also considered the text and
legislative history of the statute, which here explicitly referred to
“jurisdiction.” 177 Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Ginsburg) again
dissented, arguing that text should prevail over precedent and noting
that the Court had in two previous cases “ignored[,] and thus

the class of limitations on subject-matter jurisdiction unless Congress says otherwise.”); see also
id. (“The time limit at issue here, far from defining the set of cases that may be adjudicated, is
much more like a statute of limitations, which provides an affirmative defense, and is not
jurisdictional.” (citations omitted)). According to Justice Souter, the majority’s conclusion was
inconsistent with its recent decisions in this area:
[T]he Court’s opinion in this case . . . suddenly restores Robinson’s indiscriminate use
of the “mandatory and jurisdictional” label to good law in the face of three unanimous
repudiations of Robinson’s error [in Kontrick, Eberhart, and Arbaugh]. This is
puzzling, the more so because our recent (and . . . unanimous) efforts to confine
jurisdictional rulings to jurisdiction proper were obviously sound, and the majority
opinion makes no attempt to show that they were not.
Id. at 216 (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 220.
172. Dane, supra note 16, at 168. See Leading Cases, Statutory Time Limits to Appeal, 121
HARV. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2006) (“[B]y ruling that the mere presence of a time limit in a
statute made it jurisdictional, the Court failed to take statutory purposes and history seriously and
created a rule only a step less obscuring and overbroad than the old treatment of jurisdictionality
the Court had campaigned to reform.”).
173. Scott Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v. Russell, 43 TULSA L. REV. 631, 632 (2008). For
additional criticism, see Dodson, Bowles, supra note 16, at 43 (“By eliding the complexity and
far reach of jurisdictional characterizations, Bowles creates tension with precedent and increases
the risk of wasted litigant and judicial resources.”); Kantrowitz, supra note 16, at 289–90
(offering a critique of Dodson’s proposals).
174. 552 U.S. 130, 133–34 (2008).
175. Id. at 132.
176. See id. at 134 (“The Court has long interpreted the court of claims limitation statute as
setting forth this . . . more absolute[] kind of limitations period.”).
177. Id. at 134–36. The majority opinion stopped short of explicitly labeling this provision
“jurisdictional,” instead holding that the time limit could and should be raised by the court sua
sponte. Id. at 132.
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presumably
abandoned,”
precedent
“customarily”
requiring
jurisdictional treatment of “statutes of limitations in suits against the
Government.” 178 In a separate dissent, Justice Ginsburg also stressed
the tension between this decision and her “recent efforts to apply the
term ‘jurisdictional’ with greater precision”: 179 “After today’s decision,
one will need a crystal ball to predict when this Court will reject, and
when it will cling to, its prior decisions interpreting legislative texts.” 180
E. Phase Four: Formalization Revived (2009–Present)
Since John R. Sand & Gravel, Justice Ginsburg seems to have
successfully reasserted control over the development of jurisdictionalcharacterization doctrine. A majority of Justices now agree that the
appropriate analysis focuses on features of the legal provision at issue
and considers precedent only secondarily.
The first sign of this realignment was Justice Ginsburg’s 2009
opinion for a unanimous Court in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen. 181 In Union
Pacific, the Court held that procedural rules raised sua sponte by
members of National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) panels could
not be considered jurisdictional, given the text and structure of the
statutes conferring authority on the NRAB to adjudicate disputes.182
The Court reasoned that “[i]f the NRAB lacks authority to define the
jurisdiction of its panels, . . . surely the panels themselves lack that
authority.” 183 The opinion presented the character of the rules at issue
as a straightforward matter of the implications of statutory text.
Justice Thomas wrote an opinion for another unanimous Court the
following year in United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, the next

178. Id. at 140 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484 (1967); Bowen v.
City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986)).
179. Id. at 145 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 146.
181. 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009).
182. Id. at 597. Justice Ginsburg wrote:
The additional requirement of a conference . . . is independent of the [collective
bargaining agreement] process. . . . [T]he conference requirement is stated in the
“[g]eneral duties” section of the R[ailroad ]L[abor ]A[ct], a section that is not moored
to the “[e]stablishment[,] . . . powers[,] and duties” of the NRAB . . . . Rooted in [a
specific statutory provision] and often informal in practice, conferencing is surely no
more ‘jurisdictional’ than is the presuit resort to the EEOC held forfeitable in Zipes.
And if the requirement to conference is not ‘jurisdictional,’ then failure initially to
submit proof of a conferencing [one of the grounds of the NRAB decision being
reviewed] cannot be of that genre.
Id. (citations omitted). See infra Part III on the implications of the last sentence of this passage.
183. Id. at 598.

ARTICLES_4_PETROSKI.DOCX

2012]

11/6/2012 11:34 AM

Statutory Genres

227

decision to touch on characterization. 184
The question of
jurisdictionality was not at issue in United Student Aid, 185 but Justice
Thomas’s opinion addressed it anyway, adopting Justice Ginsburg’s
text- and structure-focused approach. 186 In this way, United Student
Aid indicated the beginnings of a principled, functionalist justification
for Justice Ginsburg’s characterization framework, one tying that
framework to broader policies of institutional power allocation.
The Court’s most recent decisions—four and counting over the past
three terms—have continued to clarify the relationship between textand precedent-focused characterization decisions and the grounding of
these decisions in principles of judicial power. In Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
Muchnick, 187 another Justice Thomas opinion, the Court followed
Justice Ginsburg’s Kontrick distinction between jurisdictional and
claim-processing rules in classifying the statutory requirement that
copyright holders register their copyrights before filing suit as a
“nonjurisdictional limitation[] on causes of action.” 188 In reasoning
reminiscent of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Union Pacific, Justice
Thomas justified this conclusion based largely on features of statutory
text:
A statutory condition that requires a party to take some action before
filing a lawsuit is not automatically “a jurisdictional prerequisite to
suit.” Rather, the jurisdictional analysis must focus on the “legal
character” of the requirement, which we discern[] by looking to the
condition’s text, context, and relevant historical treatment. 189

This analysis was not inconsistent with Bowles, Justice Thomas insisted,
because “Bowles stands [only] for the proposition that context,
including this Court’s interpretation of similar provisions in many years
184. 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010).
185. United Student Aid held that an order confirming the discharge of a student loan debt in
the absence of certain findings and procedures could not be considered “void” under Federal Rule
60(b)(4). Id. at 1373.
186. Id. at 1377–78. Justice Thomas noted,
This case presents no occasion to . . . define the precise circumstances in which a
jurisdictional error will render a judgment void because United does not argue that the
Bankruptcy Court’s error was jurisdictional. Such an argument would fail in any
event. First, [11 U.S.C.] § 523(a)(8)’s statutory requirement that a bankruptcy court
find undue hardship before discharging a student loan debt is a precondition to
obtaining a discharge order, not a limitation on the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.
Second, the requirement that a bankruptcy court make this finding in an adversary
proceeding derives from the Bankruptcy Rules, which are “procedural rules adopted by
the Court for the orderly transaction of business” that are “not jurisdictional.”
Id. (citations omitted).
187. 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
188. Id. at 1243–44.
189. Id. at 1246–47 (citations omitted).
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past, is relevant to whether a statute ranks a requirement as
jurisdictional.” 190 Also relevant in Justice Thomas’s jurisdictionalcharacterization analysis are wording, structure, placement, and the
implications of other provisions. 191
More recent decisions have continued to develop and expand this
jurisdictional-characterization framework. In 2010, the Court in Dolan
190. Id. at 1247–48. Justice Thomas continued:
Bowles . . . demonstrates that the relevant question . . . is not . . . whether § 411(a) [the
registration requirement at issue in Muchnick] itself has long been labeled
jurisdictional, but whether the type of limitation that § 411(a) imposes is one that is
properly regarded as jurisdictional absent an express designation. The statutory
limitation in Bowles was of a type that we had long held did “speak in jurisdictional
terms” even absent a “jurisdictional” label . . . .
. . . Although § 411(a)’s historical treatment as “jurisdictional” is a factor . . . , it is
not dispositive. The other factors discussed . . . demonstrate that § 411(a)’s registration
requirement is more analogous to the nonjurisdictional conditions we considered in
Zipes and Arbaugh than to the statutory time limit at issue in Bowles.
Id. at 1248 (citations omitted).
191. Justice Thomas’s methodical analysis indicates the variety of considerations relevant to
the determination:
We must consider whether § 411(a) “clearly states” that its registration requirement is
“jurisdictional.” It does not. . . . [The statute’s] reference to “jurisdiction” cannot bear
the weight that amicus places upon it. . . .
Congress added this sentence . . . to clarify that a federal court can determine “the
issue of registrability of the copyright claim” even if the Register does not appear in
the infringement suit. That clarification was necessary because courts had interpreted
§ 411(a)’s precursor provision . . . as prohibiting copyright owners who had been
refused registration by the Register . . . from suing for infringement until the owners
first sought mandamus against the Register. . . . The word “jurisdiction,” as used here,
thus says nothing about whether a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims for infringement of unregistered works.
Moreover, § 411(a)’s registration requirement, like Title VII’s numerosity
requirement, is located in a provision “separate” from those granting federal courts
subject-matter jurisdiction over those respective claims. . . .
Nor does any other factor suggest that . . . § 411(a)’s registration requirement can be
read to “speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the
district courts.” First, and most significantly, § 411(a) expressly allows courts to
adjudicate infringement claims involving unregistered works in three circumstances
. . . . Separately, § 411(c) permits courts to adjudicate infringement claims over certain
kinds of unregistered works . . . . It would be at least unusual to ascribe jurisdictional
significance to a condition subject to these sorts of exceptions.
Id. at 1245–46 (citations omitted).
Justice Ginsburg concurred in part and in the judgment, writing to explain how Muchnick could
be reconciled with Arbaugh and Bowles, and more precisely why precedent properly played no
role in the Muchnick inquiry. Arbaugh, she maintained, had presented the general text- and
structure-based framework for analysis of jurisdictional characterization issues. Id. at 1250
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and in judgment). Bowles offered an exception to that rule for
statutes subject to “longstanding decisions of this court typing the relevant provisions
‘jurisdictional.’” Id. at 1251. Since only lower courts, and not the Supreme Court, had
characterized the copyright-registration provision in Muchnick as jurisdictional, these previous
characterizations were irrelevant to the Court’s decision in this case. Id.

ARTICLES_4_PETROSKI.DOCX

2012]

11/6/2012 11:34 AM

Statutory Genres

229

v. United States examined the status of a statutory time limit on a
district court’s “determination of the victim’s losses” for purposes of a
restitution order against a criminal defendant. 192 In explaining the
majority’s decision that a court might set a restitution amount after this
time limit had expired, Justice Breyer noted that the Court’s doctrine
distinguished among “‘jurisdictional’ condition[s],” forfeitable “claimsprocessing rules,” and “time-related directive[s] that [are] legally
enforceable but do[] not deprive a judge . . . of the power to take the
action to which the deadline applies if the deadline is missed,” the last
category fitting the provision at issue. 193 In his dissent, Chief Justice
Roberts criticized Justice Breyer’s discussion of characterization issues,
finding it “perplexing” that the majority would “suggest[] that
references to the authority of trial courts necessarily implicate questions
of jurisdiction.” 194 This difference of opinion suggests some resistance
on the current Court to extend jurisdictional-characterization doctrine
into other areas implicating judicial power—but it was a minority
position, and moreover, not a criticism of the basic framework
developed by Justice Ginsburg in Kontrick, Arbaugh, and Muchnick. 195
As noted in the Introduction to this Article, Justice Alito’s opinion for
a unanimous Court 196 in Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki197
similarly reviewed jurisdictional-characterization doctrine beyond its
relevance to the issue in the case. Noting that the question “whether a
procedural rule is ‘jurisdictional’” is “not merely semantic but one of
considerable practical importance for judges and litigants,” 198 Justice
Alito described the jurisdictional-characterization analysis as involving,
first, consideration of the content of the rule at issue (“rules that seek to
promote the orderly process of litigation by requiring that the parties
take certain procedural steps at certain specified times,” for example,
being “quintessential claim-processing rules”); second, a determination
of whether Congress has “attach[ed] the consequences that go with the
192. 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2538 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C § 3664(d)(5)).
193. Id. at 2538–39.
194. Id. at 2547–48 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In response, Justice Breyer observed for the
majority, “[T]he dissent’s assertion—that it uses the term ‘authority’ not in its ‘jurisdictional’
sense, but rather in the sense that a court lacks ‘authority’ to ‘impose a sentence above the
maximum’—introduces a tenuous analogy that may well confuse this Court’s precedents
regarding the term ‘jurisdictional.’” Id. at 2543–44 (citations omitted).
195. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text (discussing Kontrick); supra notes 157–
64 and accompanying text (discussing Arbaugh); supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text
(discussing Muchnick).
196. Justice Kagan recused herself from the case.
197. 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011). Henderson concerned a statutory timing requirement for the
filing of notices of appeal from denials of claims of veterans’ benefits. Id. at 1200.
198. Id. at 1202–03.
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jurisdictional label to a rule that we would prefer to call a claimprocessing rule,” either explicitly, by using the term “jurisdictional,” or
by textual and structural implication; and third, an examination of
whether “‘a long line of this Court’s decisions left undisturbed by
Congress’ has treated a similar requirement as ‘jurisdictional,’” as in
Bowles. 199 In a lengthy analysis applying this framework to the
provision in Henderson, Justice Alito concluded that the statute’s “120day deadline for seeking Veterans Court review was not meant to have
jurisdictional attributes.” 200
Most recently, in January 2012, the Court held in Gonzalez v. Thaler
that a provision in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), which requires certificates of appealability in federal
habeas corpus proceedings to “indicate which specific issue” of
constitutional violation the petitioner had presented, was “not a
jurisdictional requirement.” 201 The issue of the jurisdictionality of the
provision had not been raised by the state in earlier stages of the
litigation, but the Court, in an opinion for eight Justices written by
Justice Sotomayor, considered it anyway. 202 Consistent with the
framework developed in the cases discussed above, Justice Sotomayor
treated this issue as a matter of statutory interpretation, considering the
text of the statute, its structure and relationship to other provisions, and
“Congress’[s] intent in [the] AEDPA.” 203 Although Justice Scalia
wrote an impassioned dissenting opinion on the question of the
provision’s jurisdictionality, he presented his contrary conclusion as
more faithful to the “[f]air [m]eaning of the [t]ext” 204 and “[p]ast
[t]reatment of [s]imilar [p]rovisions,” 205 as well as the provision’s
legislative history. 206 That is, Justice Scalia’s disagreement with the
majority concerned the inferences to be drawn from interpretive signals,
not the pertinence of those signals to the task of characterization. This
dissent may well mark the coming of age of jurisdictionalcharacterization doctrine as an established component of Supreme Court
jurisprudence on issues of legal interpretation (although the Court has
never explicitly described it as such). If new decisions continue to build
on this growing foundation, debate seems likely to concern not the

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id. at 1204.
132 S. Ct. 641, 646 (2012) (addressing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3)).
Id. at 646–56.
Id.
Id. at 656–58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 658–60.
Id. at 660–61 (discussing the “Jurisdictional Nature of Predecessor Provisions”).
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relevance of the inquiry or its appropriate reference points, but rather
the features of text, structure, and context that justifiably support
particular characterization conclusions.
F. The Current Status of Jurisdictional-Characterization Doctrine
The current state of jurisdictional-characterization doctrine contrasts
dramatically with the state of substantive-procedural characterization in
Erie doctrine. Justices are divided about the role of characterization in
Erie decision-making, in part because they remain divided about the
feasibility of this type of characterization. But every Justice of the
current Court seems to accept the validity and utility of distinguishing
between jurisdictional and other pre-litigation requirements; to agree on
most of the consequences flowing from characterization decisions
(jurisdictional requirements usually being nonwaivable, nonforfeitable,
and nondiscretionary); 207 to agree about the matters pertinent to making
characterization decisions (first, statutory text and structure, and second,
prior characterizations of the same or similar provisions); and, finally,
to understand characterization decisions as implicating issues of judicial
and party control over the course of litigation that reverberate beyond
cases in which jurisdictional characterization in its strictest sense is at
issue. (The next Section considers the contrast between these doctrines
at more length.)
This state of affairs does not make jurisdictional-characterization
doctrine immune to criticism, or imply that it will undergo no further
development. Like other issues of legal interpretation, virtually all
jurisdictional-characterization decisions have an inevitable discretionary
dimension, 208 and, as the Gonzalez opinions indicate, disagreements
about the application of the agreed-upon framework will continue to

207. Scott Dodson’s work has contributed to clarification of this issue. See, e.g., Dodson,
Removal Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 60 (noting, for example, that subject matter jurisdictional
defects cannot be “forfeited, waived, or consented to”); Dodson, Hybridizing, supra note 4, at
1445 (describing jurisdiction as a rigid set of rules and effects, rather than something controllable
by the parties themselves, in that it is “not subject to the principles of equity, waiver, forfeiture,
consent, or estoppel”); Dodson, Bowles, supra note 16, at 42 (“[W]hether a particular limitation
is jurisdictional or not can be an important question, for jurisdictional limitations are not subject
to waiver or equitable exceptions, may be raised at any time, and obligate courts to monitor and
raise them sua sponte.”). See also Dane, supra note 4, at 40 (characterizing jurisdictional rules as
mandatory by nature, and indicating that “courts cannot waive them as a matter of discretion, or
put aside their consequences”).
208. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 588
(1985) (“[T]he responsibility of the federal courts to adjudicate disputes does and should carry
with it significant leeway for the exercise of reasoned discretion in matters relating to federal
jurisdiction.”).
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generate some unpredictability. 209 Consideration of “context” is an
important source of discretion and unpredictability in this area, just as it
is in the Erie characterization area and in legal interpretation
generally. 210
More specifically, it seems inevitable that at some point the Court
will need to address the extent to which federal rules are subject to the
same text- and structure-focused analysis as federal statutes that set
forth litigation prerequisites. Scott Dodson, one of the most visible and
prolific of a handful of commentators in this area over the past decade,
has seemed to urge a unified framework for the characterization of both
statutes and federal rules. 211 He has proposed a four-factor analysis
considering: (1) the presence or absence of statutory designation of a
provision as jurisdictional; (2) the function of the provision; (3) whether
the consequences of characterizing the provision as jurisdictional would
be consistent with that function; and (4) previous judicial treatment of
the provision. 212 Initially advanced in 2008, this framework roughly
describes the Court’s current approach to the jurisdictional
characterization of statutes.
While Dodson does not describe
jurisdictional-characterization doctrine as a matter of statutory
interpretation, his recommended factors—and those actually cited by
the Court in its jurisdictional-characterization decisions—are familiar to
students of statutory interpretation. 213 Whether rule interpretation
should proceed along identical lines is open to debate.
G. A Preliminary Comparison
Still, the decisions in this area have steadily, case by case, been
developing guidelines for the justification of characterization decisions,
209. See, e.g., Dane, supra note 4, at 12, 20, 37–40 (describing inconsistencies resulting from
failure to develop comprehensive framework for analysis of jurisdictionality).
210. See id. at 44 (“[I]f it did turn out that ‘jurisdictional,’ like ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural,’
had different meanings in different contexts, and that a rule of law could be jurisdictional in one
sense but not in another, there would still be a problem and a puzzle to solve.”); Lee, supra note
16, at 1614 (“[J]udges and lawyers should refrain from making appeals to the ‘nature’ or
‘concept’ of jurisdiction. Whether a particular matter is to be treated as ‘jurisdictional’ or ‘the
merits’ should be decided not by resort to metaphysics, but by resort to such familiar policy
considerations as notice, reliance interests, finality, judicial efficiency, and the equities.”).
211. See supra notes 1, 4, 16, and 123 (discussing several of Dodson’s articles on the Court’s
treatment of jurisdictional issues). For other work that may have influenced the Court’s decisions
in this area, see Lees, supra note 124; Wasserman, supra note 16. See also Laura E. Little,
Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdictional Decisions, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 75 (1998) (analyzing rhetoric of Supreme Court analysis of jurisdictional issues).
212. Dodson, Removal Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 66.
213. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
830–46 (4th ed. 2007) (describing a prevailing “pragmatic” approach to statutory interpretation).
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clarifying when and how such decisions should be made, and what their
consequences should be. In this respect, jurisdictional-characterization
presents a stark contrast to the Court’s characterization practices in the
Erie context. In the jurisdictional-characterization context, the Justices
have confidently devised standards for characterization decisions that
can appeal to both those Justices with formalist interpretive allegiances
and those of a more functionalist or eclectic bent. Many Justices seem
willing to note the potential relevance of characterization distinctions to
distinct types of decisions. In the Erie context, no such guidelines have
emerged, even though Justices have, generation after generation,
continued to fall back on substantive-procedural distinctions in
explaining their conclusions. 214
The differences in development do not overwhelm the basic parallels
between the types of decisions required in each area. In both, a
characterization decision can determine an outcome.
In both,
characterization is ultimately an interpretive task, partly a matter of
respecting lawmakers’ purposes, and partly a matter of weighing the
anticipated effects of characterization. Characterization in both areas
involves a kind of higher-order lawmaking—the establishment of rules
for distinguishing between lower-order legal rules—but this lawmaking
has proceeded further in the jurisdictional-characterization context than
in the Erie context. In both areas, any such higher-order rules, as well
as the categories into which they sort lower-order legal rules, are
meaningful mostly, if not only, to the legally trained. 215 The esoteric
nature of characterization decisions may discourage appreciation of
their importance as well as scholarly and judicial investment in
doctrinal development. In the Erie context in particular, it may seem
more difficult to make a judicial reputation through the elaboration of
higher-order procedural doctrine, since the Erie choice-of-law question
also affords judges the opportunity to develop doctrine on more
glamorous and accessible constitutional and quasi-constitutional
topics. 216

214. See, e.g., supra Parts I.B–E (tracing the history and development of substantiveprocedural characterization in the context of Erie doctrine).
215. See Dane, supra note 4, at 84 (“[T]he law of jurisdiction, particularly on matters as
arcane as time limits, is quintessential ‘lawyer’s law,’ loved by judges but provoking legislatures
to a collective yawn.”); Dodson, Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, supra note 123, at 30
(“Federal jurisdiction . . . is seen as ‘law for lawyers’ because it concerns the intricate navigation
of the federal-court system as opposed to the regulation of primarily lay conduct.”).
216. In the constitutional context, the elaboration of doctrine (that is, second-order rules for
the implementation of those rules contained in the Constitution itself), and commentary on that
doctrine, have recently been a growth industry among Justices and scholars. See, e.g., Mitchell
N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Brannon P. Denning, The
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To date, no commentator has seriously considered the implications of
these parallels. This Article has begun mapping them in order to make
the case for a consistent approach to legal characterization drawing on
the Court’s best practices in each area. A thorough inquiry, however,
requires more than just comparisons of the decisions in each area. It
also requires looking directly at the lawmaking function performed by
courts (especially courts of last resort) making characterization
decisions and understanding exactly what kind of law courts are making
in the course of such decisions, and how. As the next Part explains,
legal characterization is not just a kind of lawmaking, but also an
example of an even more general human activity: the classification of
texts into categories, or genres, in the process of interpreting them, that
is, making them meaningful and putting them to practical use. Only by
looking directly at what legal characterization involves can we
understand the nature of the threat, if any, it poses to legislative
supremacy and legal consistency.
III. THE COURT AS GENRE THEORIST
In Union Pacific, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that if one of the
statutory requirements at issue in the case was “not ‘jurisdictional,’”
then a different, disputed requirement could not “be of that genre”
either. 217
Justice Ginsburg has elsewhere referred to legal
characterization as a matter of genre identification, 218 but she is
New Doctrinalism in Constitutional Scholarship and District of Columbia v. Heller, 75 TENN. L.
REV. 789 (2008); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996
Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1997); Kermit
Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA.
L. REV. 1649 (2005); Micah W.J. Smith, Popular Metadoctrinalism: The Next Frontier?, 1
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 507 (2007).
217. See 130 S. Ct. 584, 597 (2009) (“[I]f the requirement to conference [prior to submission
of a dispute to the NRAB] is not ‘jurisdictional,’ then failure initially to submit proof of a
conferencing cannot be of that genre.”).
218. See, e.g., Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002) (“Unlike 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and
EAJA, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) does not authorize the prevailing party to recover fees from the losing
party. Section 406(b) is of another genre: It authorizes fees payable from the successful party’s
recovery.” (citations omitted)); Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 385 (2002) (“Rule 24.10, like other
state and federal rules of its genre, serves a governmental interest of undoubted legitimacy.”);
Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 435 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“This Court has
recognized one sharply honed exception to rules of the [Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure]
29(c)/45(b) genre [which prescribe time and preclude extensions].”).
Most often, however, Justice Ginsburg has used the term “genre” to refer to types of decisions,
cases, or claims; this usage seems related to her notion of jurisdictional rules as those pertaining
to “classes of cases.” See, e.g., Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323, 2334–35
(2010) (referring to “cases of this genre” and “other cases of the same genre”); Kucana v. Holder,
130 S. Ct. 827, 836 (2010) (referring to “decisions of the same genre”); Plains Commerce Bank v.

ARTICLES_4_PETROSKI.DOCX

2012]

11/6/2012 11:34 AM

Statutory Genres

235

virtually alone among her current colleagues in drawing this parallel.219
Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 343 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (concluding that Tribal Court is “competent to
adjudicate” claims of a certain “genre”); Empire Healthchoice Assurance., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547
U.S. 677, 683 (2006) (referring to “claims of this genre”); Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293,
314 (2006) (referring to “a claim of that genre”); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511
(2006) (referring to “[c]ases of this genre,” i.e., “‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings’”); Wachovia
Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction . . . . poses a ‘whether,’
not a ‘where’ question: Has the Legislature empowered the court to hear cases of a certain
genre?”); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 121 (2005) (“In cases of this
genre . . . the Court has resisted adoption of a categorical rule.”); Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546
U.S. 81, 92 (2005) (concluding that “[d]ecisions of this genre are bottomed on this Court’s
recognition of a State’s asserted Eleventh Amendment right not to be haled into federal court”);
City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 211 (2005) (in summary of
district court’s decision, noting, “Cases of this genre, the court observed, ‘cr[ied] out for a
pragmatic approach’”); Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004) (observing that
plaintiff’s claim is “of the same genre as the hostile work environment claims the Court analyzed
in Ellerth and Faragher”); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 522 (2002) (noting, in a summary of
an appellate court’s analysis, that “Congress sought to curtail suits qualifying as ‘frivolous’
because of their ‘subject matter,’” and that the Second Circuit concluded that “[a]ctions seeking
relief from corrections officer brutality . . . are not of that genre”); Dusenbery v. United States,
534 U.S. 161, 182 (2002) (“The Due Process Clause requires nothing of the Government in cases
of this genre beyond the practicable, efficient, and inexpensive reform the BOP has already
adopted.”); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 210 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“Application of
the Graham objective reasonableness standard is both necessary . . . and . . . sufficient to resolve
cases of this genre.”); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 94 (2000) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that prior cases “hold that the party resisting
arbitration bears the burden of establishing the inadequacy of the arbitral forum for adjudication
of claims of a particular genre”); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 859 (2000) (“As we read §
844(i), Congress left cases of this genre to the law enforcement authorities of the States.”);
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 370–71 & n.3 (1999) (“UNUM cites a
handful of California cases of this genre.”); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 645 n.11,
672 (1997) (“Rule 14e-3(a), as applied to cases of this genre, qualifies . . . as a ‘means reasonably
designed to prevent’ fraudulent trading on material, nonpublic information.”); United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535 (1996) (“In cases of this genre, our precedent instructs that ‘benign’
justifications proffered in defense of categorical exclusions will not be accepted automatically . . .
.”); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111 (1995) (“This Court has reasoned that a trial court is
better positioned to make decisions of this genre . . . .”); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 27 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referring to “another case of the same genre”).
See also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007) (referring to
certain inferences of scienter as “irrefutable, i.e., of the ‘smoking-gun’ genre”); Howard Delivery
Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 662 (2006) (referring to “genre of plan” at issue
in an ERISA action); Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 380 (2005) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “Congress has enacted a specific statute criminalizing offenses of the
genre committed by the defendants” in the case); Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing
Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 618 (2003) (“Portions of the complaint . . . are of this genre.”);
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127 (1996) (“Sanctions of the Williams genre . . . are not merely
disproportionate in impact.”).
219. Occasionally, Justice Scalia has indulged in similar usage. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
338 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Suspension Acts had been adopted (and many more
proposed) both in this country and in England during the late 18th century. . . . Typical of the
genre was the prescription by the Statute of 1794 that ‘[a previous statute] be suspended [for one
year].’”); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 978 n.8 (1991) (noting that the New Hampshire
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This Part explains why Justice Ginsburg’s apparently casual
observations are more than a superficially appropriate metaphor. In
fact, in its characterization doctrine, the Court has implicitly acted on
and anticipated many of the conclusions reached by genre theorists; that
is, scholars studying the history and practice of textual classification.
As Justice Ginsburg’s usage suggests, and as this Part will show, the
characterization of legal rules is one kind of generic categorization.
Rule characterization of many varieties other than those discussed in
Parts I and II is endemic in legal practice. Every first-year law student
in the United States is drilled in distinguishing among legal authorities
based on their source—understanding the respective characteristics of
statutes (enacted by legislatures), Rules (usually issued by committees
and approved by legislatures), and doctrinal rules (created by judges and
lawyers), among other categories. Students receive less explicit
instruction in non-source-based rules for the characterization of legal
rules within each of these categories. Such non-source-based rules are
almost exclusively doctrinal. Both Erie doctrine and jurisdictionalcharacterization doctrine are examples of guidelines for the
characterization of legal rules other than by source; both can function to
characterize rules within a single source category or across categories.
In the interest of simplicity, this Part focuses on the “intra-source”
characterization of specifically statutory rules. This is perhaps the most
troublesome sort of legal characterization, since it involves judicial
determinations of the effects of legal rules created by a competing
authority. Most of the points made below, however, are also pertinent,
with appropriate modification, to the characterization of legal rules
whose source is in the judicial branch, such as Federal Rules, local
rules, and precedential or doctrinal rules.
Part III.A below considers some objections to taking Justice
Ginsburg’s expression seriously and explains why it makes sense, under
current theoretical understandings of discourse genres, to refer to legal
characterization decisions as decisions about genre. Although legal
rules, especially statutes, differ from the kinds of texts we are
accustomed to thinking of as generically distinguishable, it is indeed
useful to think of sorting legal rules and statutes into genres, in more
than a metaphorical way. In fact, American lawyers are trained to do
this in many ways other than the two on which this Article focuses. Part
III.B then presents some basic assumptions and insights of genre theory,
tracing the development of that theory from antiquity to the present.
This review shows that the Court’s approaches to legal characterization
proportionality in sentencing provision is “the most detailed of the genre”).
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are consistent with the most sophisticated contemporary work on the
topic and have even, in some ways, been in advance of that work.
A. Why Genre Theory?
1. Legal Rules Are Relevantly Similar to Other Texts
One might question the accuracy of describing distinctions among
types of statutes as generic distinctions. Statutes represent an unusual,
perhaps unique, use of language; they are created and used differently
from most other texts. 220 Statutes also have political and cultural
functions different from those of aesthetic and even other functional
texts. But none of these differences makes it inaccurate to think of
distinctions among statutes as, basically, generic distinctions.
Since the early twentieth century, critiques of the traditional notion of
legislative intent have pointed out that statutes lack individual “authors”
in the sense that, for example, novels have authors. 221 In light of this
fact, it might seem misguided to think of statutes as differentiable into
genres, especially to those inclined to think that the generic identity of a
text is determined by authorial adherence to established models (as the
older versions of genre theory discussed below held) or creative
authorial choice. But the corporate authorship of statutes is, strictly
speaking, irrelevant to their generic features. In fact, contemporary
genre theorists focus mainly on how we recognize and understand
communications with multiple or ambiguous authorship, such as films,
corporate communications, and public records. 222 Moreover, as
220. The same is true of Federal Rules, local rules, and appellate opinions.
221. See, e.g., Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870–71 (1930)
(discussing implications of collective authorship of statutes). A similar point could be made
about Federal Rules, local rules, and appellate opinions.
222. An important early departure from the traditional focus on high-art texts in studies of
genre was Mikhail Bakhtin’s mid-twentieth-century work, which argued for the basic kinship of
literary genres (the kind of “highly developed and organized cultural communication”
traditionally addressed by poetics) with all communications, including ordinary forms of
utterance, like greetings and “[single-word] rejoinder[s].” Mikhail Bakhtin, The Problem of
Speech Genres (1952–53), in SPEECH GENRES AND OTHER LATE ESSAYS 60, 61–72 (Vern W.
McGee trans., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist eds., 1986). Following Bakhtin, twentiethcentury scholars have examined and theorized about genres of not just film and popular culture,
but also, for example, academic research articles, the opinion letters of tax accountants, and
presidential State of the Union addresses. See, e.g., CAROL BERKENKOTTER & THOMAS N.
HUCKIN,
GENRE
KNOWLEDGE
IN
DISCIPLINARY
COMMUNICATION:
COGNITION/CULTURE/POWER 31–43 (1995) (discussing generic features of scientific journal
articles); KARLYN KOHRS CAMPBELL & KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DEEDS DONE IN WORDS:
PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE GENRES OF GOVERNANCE 52–75 (1990) (providing a critical
analysis of presidential discourse, including, in particular, the State of the Union Address); AMY
J. DEVITT, WRITING GENRES 66–87 (2004) (discussing the genres used by tax accountants,
particularly features of tax regulations and accountant opinion letters); BARRY KEITH GRANT,
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explained below, the generic identity of a text does not preexist the
attribution of that identity to the text, so the generic dimension of any
particular communication is always, in a sense, multi-authored (by at
least the drafter and the reader). 223
There are further differences between statutes and other texts that
might seem to make the notion of statutory genres problematic. For
example, we read statutes very differently from the way we “read” most
other texts—even those, like films and political speeches, that have
multiple authors. The “reader” of a film usually considers the film as a
whole, from beginning to end, at least once. And the ability to see that
film as an example of a particular genre seems to presuppose this type
of unified “reading.” We come to be fluent in recognizing a film as a
Western, for example, after seeing several films identified as Westerns;
from their similarities, we extrapolate the characteristics we expect of a
Western, including large-scale characteristics like narrative arc and
character development, as well as details of form and content.224
Ordinarily, then, it seems we attain competence in making genre
distinctions through exposure to whole texts. 225 With the possible
exception of legislative drafters and analysts, however, virtually no one
reads statutes in this way; for many statutes, such a reading would be

FILM GENRE: FROM ICONOGRAPHY TO IDEOLOGY 33 (2007) (discussing study of “genre films”);
JANICE A. RADWAY, READING THE ROMANCE: WOMEN, PATRIARCHY, AND POPULAR CULTURE
119–56 (1984) (exploring generic features and implications of pulp romance fiction, such as the
way principal characters are portrayed, the narrative structure of the ideal romance, and the
qualities of a romantic heroine); JOHN M. SWALES, GENRE ANALYSIS: ENGLISH IN ACADEMIC
AND RESEARCH SETTINGS 114–95 (Michael H. Long & Jack C. Richards eds., 1990) (discussing
the features and construction of the “research article” as genre); Catherine F. Schryer, Genre
Time/Space: Chronotopic Strategies in the Experimental Article, 19 JAC: A JOURNAL OF
COMPOSITION THEORY 81 (1999) (discussing generic features of articles reporting results of
scientific experiments). While many of these non-literary genres are distinctly modern
communication forms, current writing on genre also studies distinctions among older discourse
forms that went unremarked in earlier periods. See, e.g., DEVITT, supra, at 99–135 (analyzing
generic characteristics and shifts in early modern Scottish religious treatises, official
correspondence, public records, and private correspondence and records).
223. See DEVITT, supra note 222, at 33 (“[G]enres require multiplicity, multiple actions by
multiple people.”); ALASTAIR FOWLER, KINDS OF LITERATURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
THEORY OF GENRES AND MODES 92, 144, 155 (1982) (making similar points).
224. Cf. GRANT, supra note 222, at 21 (“Genre films work by engaging viewers through an
implicit contract. They encourage certain expectations on the part of spectators, which in turn are
based on viewer familiarity with the conventions.”).
225. See, e.g., JONATHAN CULLER, STRUCTURALIST POETICS: STRUCTURALISM, LINGUISTICS
AND THE STUDY OF LITERATURE 113–30 (1975) (developing a holistic account of genre, starting
with the phonological and grammatical structure of word sequences and their connection to
meaning); FOWLER, supra note 223, at 45 (“[S]ometimes readers can grasp a genre with
mysterious celerity, on the basis of seemingly quite inadequate samples, almost as if they were
forming a hologram from scattered traces.”).
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impossible. 226 Again, however, statutes are not really unique in this
sense. We can and do develop generic competence without exposure to
entire texts. 227 For example, we all can recognize a troubleshooting
guide without ever necessarily having perused one from beginning to
end.
Cognizant of such everyday practices of comprehension,
contemporary genre theory recognizes that parts of communications
may have generic identities, that these parts may independently
contribute to the generic identity of a larger communication, and that
texts in some genres are actually characterized by segmentability, not
unity. Many, perhaps most, legal rules and statutes are of precisely this
type.
Another objection to thinking of statutes in terms of genre might
focus on the ways in which legislative language differs from other
language uses—apart from features of authorship and form. In a 1990
article on the nature of legislative language, Heidi Hurd argued for such
a special status for legislative language use. 228 Hurd noted that many
judicial and theoretical approaches to statutory meaning assume that
statutes are communications analogous to direct commands from one
individual to another, but she maintained that this assumption is a
misconception.
According to Hurd, “communication,” strictly
speaking, cannot be said to occur unless all parties involved—listeners
as well as speakers—can and do occupy appropriate mental states.229
Statutory language, she argued, does not support such communicative
intentions. 230 Thus, it should be understood not as a form of
communication, but as “description” of a political-ethical reality
226. For example, the content of many statutes undergoes continuous change through
amendment, and statutes often incorporate other statutes by reference. Cf. David S. Law & David
Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1653, 1698–703 (2010) (presenting an analysis of linguistic complexity and
frequency of amending selected major federal statutes). Federal Rules, local rules, and appellate
opinions are likely more often read as unified texts, and to the extent they are, this objection to
considering them in generic terms is weakened.
227. An academic, for example, can recognize research articles as such through formal
features and contextual cues without necessarily ever having read an entire example of the genre.
BERKENKOTTER & HUCKIN, supra note 222, at 31–43; see SWALES, supra note 222, at 114–70
(discussing the features and construction of the academic research article as genre).
228. Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945 (1990). For a similar argument
against the application of “ordinary language” principles to legislative language, see Paul E.
McGreal, Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in Statutory Interpretation, 52 U.
KAN. L. REV. 325 (2004); but see FREDERICK BOWERS, LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF LEGISLATIVE
EXPRESSION 18–46 (1989) (analyzing legislative “expression” as linguistically analogous to
ordinary interpersonal communication).
229. Hurd, supra note 228, at 958–81. More specifically, communication as defined by Hurd
(following W.V. Quine) involves an intent, on a communicator’s part, to produce a certain
intentional state in recipients of the communication. Id. at 958–62.
230. Id. at 968–81.
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identified and constructed by legislators, a description Hurd’s
sophisticated argument compares to the entries in a scientist’s
notebook. 231 Hurd’s argument presents a difficulty for the inquiry
proposed here, however, only if language needs to be “communication”
to have a generic identity. As explained below, no such requirement
exists. In fact, Hurd’s position is consistent with contemporary
understandings of genre distinctions, which do not demand an
alignment of mental states between authors and readers, and
acknowledge that we sometimes recognize classes of texts based on
characteristics of which their authors and some of their readers are
unaware. 232
A final objection to thinking of statutes in terms of genre might point
to the difficulty of devising any fixed and comprehensive single scheme
for classifying statutes and other legal rules into genres. 233 As Cook
pointed out, for example, the same statute can be classified as
substantive for one purpose and procedural for another. 234 And statutes
and their parts can be differentiated along many dimensions. A single
civil rights enactment, for example, could include jurisdictional
provisions, savings clauses, and retroactive provisions, among other
components. 235 These features of statutory law make it challenging to
develop a doctrine of statutory categorization, conceived as a doctrine
of generic classification. But the task is not impossible. In no area does
the identification of textual genres depend on the existence of a fixed
scheme for sorting those genres. As explained below, generic
distinctions are now understood as ultimately arising from the ways
texts are used—and, clearly, some texts can be used in multiple ways.
To take just one example, an academic research article can be used as a
pedagogical tool, a journalistic source, or a premise in a subsequent
researcher’s argument. Yet the article is still identifiable as a particular
type of text in each of these contexts. Such a text can function usefully
in several distinct roles, just as a legal rule can function differently in
different contexts.
2. Habits of Legal Characterization Are Pervasive and Internalized
If we can defensibly think of legal characterization as a kind of
231. Id. at 983, 990–1009.
232. DEVITT, supra note 222, at 132–34.
233. See discussion infra note 295 and accompanying text (addressing the impossibility of
creating a comprehensive “map” of genres).
234. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text (introducing Cook’s skeptical approach to
characterization).
235. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq.).
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generic classification, why do lawyers not do so more often? Why does
the Court fail to see the analogy, for example, between the kinds of
characterization involved in the legal traditions discussed above and
other kinds of textual classification—or, for that matter, the analogy
between the two types of characterization discussed in Parts I and II of
this Article? A definitive answer to these questions would require much
more extensive discussion of, for instance, the psychology of legal
practice and reasoning than is possible in the space available here. This
Part, however, outlines the beginnings of an explanation, stressing the
very pervasiveness of legal characterization practices.
Legal
characterization is not just a component of judicial reasoning, but
something that all legal professionals do every day in a dizzying variety
of contexts. Legal education and practice require legal professionals to
understand legal rules as belonging to a welter of “natural kinds.” 236
These “kinds” are the basic premises of legal and legal-academic
discourse; lawmakers’ and lawyers’ distinct social roles are based
largely on their ability to recognize and manipulate such distinctions.237
Legal professionals have traditionally been more concerned with
making and manipulating the distinctions, however, than with
questioning the grounds for making them or likening them to activities
that non-legal professionals engage in. This Part surveys some of the
assumptions about “kinds” of legal rules structuring lawmaking, legal
education, and legal scholarship, and describes a few of the mechanisms
encouraging silence about them in legal doctrine and commentary.
First, those responsible for the creation of statutes understand their
task in terms of statutory “natural kinds.” Manuals for and by
legislative drafters counsel them to approach the composition of
amendments, for example, differently from the composition of statutes
that add to existing law without changing it, 238 and explain how revenue
236. In philosophy, the term “natural kind” refers to a grouping of particulars that has a group
identity independent of the attribution of any such identity to the group by an observer. The
chemical elements are the classic example of natural kinds offered by those who defend the
meaningfulness of the concept. Whether natural kinds actually exist continues to be a topic of
philosophical debate. See, e.g., W.V. Quine, Natural Kinds, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND
OTHER ESSAYS 114 (1969) (introducing the concept of natural kinds into modern philosophical
debate); Ian Hacking, Natural Kinds, in PERSPECTIVES ON QUINE 129–41 (Robert B. Barrett &
Roger F. Gibson eds., 1990) (explicating Quine’s analysis); Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of
“Meaning,” in 7 MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 131–93 (Keith
Gunderson ed., 1975) (developing Quine’s analysis). Natural kinds are closely akin to folk
categories. See infra notes 255–64 and accompanying text.
237. For an argument making a similar point from the perspective of private-law doctrine
rather than statutory law, see Jay Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV.
661 (1989).
238. See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. FILSON, THE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER’S DESK REFERENCE 168–
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bills have formal features different from those of other bills. 239 Rules
governing the legislative process also require legislators and legislative
proceduralists to think of statutes categorically. Such higher-order rules
mandating statutory characterization are partly, but not entirely, judicial
products. The Constitution wholly prohibits Congress from enacting
certain kinds of statutes, namely bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws. 240 Judicial decisions considering challenges to legislation under
these clauses involve impressive feats of classificatory analysis. 241
Legislatures’ internal rules also require parliamentarians to distinguish
private from public bills242 and to identify bills’ subject matter in order
to identify permissible (germane or relevant) amendments. 243 Many
state constitutions also regulate statutory specificity; when invoked in
litigation, such provisions require the categorization of statutes based on
their content. 244 Sorting by subject matter also structures the process of
statutory publication.
In the federal legislature, the House of
Representatives’ Office of Law Revision Counsel is responsible for
policing the organization of the United States Code 245 by gathering

207 (1992) (presenting guidelines for “writing amendatory provisions”).
239. The Constitution draws this distinction. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (requiring “Bills for
raising Revenue” to originate in the House of Representatives). See also FILSON, supra note 238,
at 404–05 (discussing “‘revenue’ style” as “a very disciplined [statutory drafting] style, and
without question the most intricate and demanding of all the accepted Federal drafting styles”);
JACK STARK, THE ART OF THE STATUTE 25 (1996) (“The multiplicity of relevant facts and the
goal of minutely regulating economic behavior . . . are two reasons for tax law’s specificity.”).
240. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. See generally Raoul Berger, Bills of Attainder: A Study of
Amendment by the Court, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 355 (1978) (providing an overview of criteria for
identifying enactments as bills of attainder); T.B.G., Note, Beyond Process: A Substantive
Rationale for the Bill of Attainder Clause, 70 VA. L. REV. 475 (1984) (discussing rationale for
constitutional characterization).
241. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468–73 (1977) (analyzing and
rejecting the argument that a federal statute authorizing Administrator of General Services to take
custody of Presidential papers was a bill of attainder).
242. See, e.g., Matthew Mantel, Private Bills and Private Laws, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 87 (2007)
(providing an overview of scope, prevalence, and features of private laws); Notes, Private Bills in
Congress, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1684 (1966) (offering early authoritative introduction to the topic).
243. See, e.g., H.R. Rule XVI, Cl. 7; see also EDWARD V. SCHNEIER & BERTRAM GROSS,
LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY: SHAPING PUBLIC POLICY 132 (1993) (discussing restrictions on
amendment).
244. See, e.g., Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure:
Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38
HARV. J. LEGIS. 101 (2001) (offering an overview of related state constitutional restrictions on
legislative form); Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U.
PITT. L. REV. 803 (2006) (reconsidering single-subject rules from a positive political theoretical
perspective); Millard H. Ruud, “No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,” 42 MINN. L.
REV. 389 (1958) (presenting an early authoritative discussion of the single-subject rule).
245. Section 205(c)(1) of House Resolution 988, 93d Cong., Pub. L. No. 93-554 (2 U.S.C.
§ 285b(1)), requires the Office of the Law Revision Counsel to
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together provisions “closely related by subject” and otherwise
“revisit[ing] the organizational structure of statutory material” to
“yield[] a statutory product that is easier to use and that fosters a more
comprehensive understanding of the law.” 246 It is the decisions made
by this legislative office (and its state analogues), as much as the
decisions of drafters and legislators, that determine the proximity of
different enactments to one another in published form, and in this
manner affect judicial conclusions about statutory type. 247
Legal education in the United States also encourages lawyers and
judges in training—even those who reflect less often on legislative
processes—to think of legal rules as naturally falling into categories
differentiated by content and function. The upper-level doctrinal
curriculum in American law schools reinforces the subject-matter
classifications that structure compilations of published statutes.
Instruction specifically focused on the implementation of statutes
perpetuates these same distinctions, as well as others. The widely used
Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett legislation casebook, for example,
includes sections on the interpretation of retroactive statutes, statutes in
pari materia (on the same subject) and modeled on other statutes, and
substantive canons (which are applicable only to certain categories of
statutes and situations). 248 The casebook also notes that many
theoretical models of legislation assume some basic distinctions among
statutory types. 249 But it does not include any readings on the grounds
prepare, and submit to the Committee on the Judiciary one title at a time, a complete
compilation, restatement, and revision of the general and permanent laws of the United
States which conforms to the understood policy, intent, and purpose of the Congress in
the original enactments, with such amendments and corrections as will remove
ambiguities, contradictions, and other imperfections both of substance and of form,
separately stated, with a view to the enactment of each title as positive law.
See FILSON, supra note 238, at 336–37 (discussing the irregularity of enactment of the
United States Code, as revised by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel, into positive
law).
246. OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, POSITIVE
LAW CODIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES CODE, available at http://uscode.house.
gov/codification/Positive%20Law%20Codification.pdf.
247. Cf. supra notes 99 and 108 and accompanying text (discussing the Shady Grove opinions
regarding the inferences to be drawn from the positioning of section 901(b) in the New York
procedural code).
248. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRETT, supra note 213, at 663–86, 880–938, 1066–81.
249. See id. at 47–82. Other legislation casebooks follow the same pattern. The Popkin
casebook includes sections devoted to retroactive statutes; the single-subject rule, state
constitutional restrictions on special legislation, and federal limitations on private legislation; and
a chapter on “statutory patterns,” including a subsection on the differences in treatment between
substantive statutes and appropriations acts, and one on “different types of statutes,” including
multilingual statues, grant-in-aid statutes, “super-statutes,” omnibus legislation, initiatives, and
“private lawmaking.” See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL
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for making and justifying such distinctions among types of statutes.
Other upper-level course material on related topics, such as judicial
review of the constitutionality of legislation, also trains students and
professors to think of laws as coming in certain “kinds,” without
prompting direct reflection on that habit. 250 The processes of legal
enculturation thus accustom future lawyers and judges to understand
statutes as naturally falling into categories that often must be identified
for legal reasoning to proceed, but these professionals are not explicitly
trained how to explain their decisions to identify statutes as belonging in
particular categories.
The same professors who create most legal instructional materials
also produce legal scholarship, including the kinds of commentary on
legal characterization mentioned throughout this Article.
But
commentary on these issues has tended to focus on particular
characterization issues, not on legal characterization in general. This
neglect is a little surprising, given academics’ interest in other higherorder legal rules—that is, rules for the choice between and treatment of
more basic rules. 251 It also has not escaped scholarly notice that all law,
LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 344–76, 394–407, 775–844, 1037–69, 1135–53 (4th
ed. 2005). See also OTTO J. HETZEL, MICHAEL E. LIBONATI, & ROBERT F. WILLIAMS,
LEGISLATIVE LAW AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION CASES AND MATERIALS 257–72, 404–11,
420–52 (4th ed. 2008) (devoting sections to the identification of “local and special legislation,”
the interpretation of statutes in pari materia, and “substantive legislation by appropriations act”) .
250. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 264–316 (3d ed. 2009)
(addressing legislation authorizing suit against state governments); id. at 607–22 (addressing
“laws protecting unionizing,” “maximum hours laws,” “minimum wage laws,” and “consumer
protection legislation”); id. at 748–942 (addressing classificatory and discriminatory laws); JESSE
A. CHOPER, RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., YALE KAMISAR, & STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 73–86 (10th ed. 2006) (addressing
“regulation of national economic problems”); id. at 111–23 (addressing regulation through taxing
and spending); id. at 1178–440 (addressing discriminatory regulation); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN
& GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 451–78 (14th ed. 2001) (addressing economic
regulations and substantive due process); id. at 605–794 (addressing economic regulation and
regulation of “fundamental interests”); id. at 863–925 (addressing civil rights legislation).
251. This interest in higher-order rules is evident, for example, in work on such topics as the
choice between rules and standards, minimalist versus maximalist decision styles, and the
selection of interpretive methods, as well as the work on constitutional doctrine noted supra note
216. On the choice between rules and standards, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards,
33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term—Foreword:
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). On minimalist decisionmaking, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (2001). On the selection of interpretive methods, see Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive
Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 (2000); Karen Petroski, Does It Matter What We Say About Legal
Interpretation?, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 359 (2012). The doctrines that would seem most
hospitable to development of decisional frameworks for statutory classification—the in pari
materia doctrine being the most obvious example—have received little or no critical analysis. In
fact, a recent Westlaw and Hein Online search revealed no scholarly analysis of the in pari
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statutory and otherwise, involves the categorization of people and
actions, and thus that work on categorization in other disciplines may be
relevant to legal theory and doctrine. 252 The focus in this scholarship,
however, has been on the categorizing that legal texts perform, not the
categorizing of the texts themselves by legal professionals and officials.
As the next Part explains, in some ways the Supreme Court is
actually more sophisticated on this point than legal commentators. The
rudimentary doctrine that the Court has developed concerning
jurisdictional characterization coheres better with the most advanced
work on genre than do the formalist recommendations of most
commentators. It might be that courts’ institutional position uniquely
qualifies judges (and litigants suggesting reasons for decision directly to
judges) as statutory classifiers and clarifiers of that practice. 253 To the
extent judges have shrunk from this role, scholarly input may be useful,
but ideally it will recognize, not disavow, courts’ basic fitness for the
task of legal characterization.
B. History and Development of Genre Theory
In Western culture outside the law, writers have been interested since
antiquity in analyzing genre—the “kinds” of literary and other
communications. 254 Despite shifts in scope and emphasis, writing of

materia rule. The absence of an explicit doctrine of statutory classification does have some
benefits. Because there has been no assumption that statutory classifications have to be justified
systematically, legal practice has rarely, if ever, categorized statutes on the neoclassical
assumption that a single coherent system of statutory types exists, even as legal doctrine became
quite neoclassical in other regards. Cf. infra Part III.B.1 (noting trends toward renewed
formalism in certain doctrinal areas).
252. See, e.g., STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 69–
103 (2001) (offering an overview that describes categorization as a “dynamic process that is
flexible in application and elastic in scope”). This topic has received particular attention in the
context of First Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study
in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1482, 1490–93 (1975) (discussing the fondness of early Warren Court for “categorizing,” rather
than “balancing,” issues related to First Amendment restrictions); Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism
and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 381–93 (2009)
(discussing features of and rationale for “categoricalism” in First and Second Amendment
doctrine).
253. See infra Part IV (discussing implications of genre theory for characterization doctrine).
254. The following discussion uses the term “communication” in a nontechnical sense, rather
than in the technical sense examined by Hurd and some philosophers of language. See supra
notes 228–31 and accompanying text. This term is more general than one available substitute,
“text,” and more familiar to the legal audience than others, like “utterance” and “discourse.” See
supra note 222 (tracing the evolution of critical genre analysis from a discipline that focused
solely on “high-art texts” to one that finds all “communications,” including “academic research
articles, the opinion letters of tax accountants, and presidential State of the Union addresses,” for
example, to be worthy of analysis).
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this sort has long done two things. First, it has described different types
of communications, either identifying distinctions already in use or
proposing new ones. Second, such writing has also typically explained
the distinctions it identifies, which involves some higher-order
accounting of why the distinctions get made as they do. This second
task is analogous to the task of elaborating a general theory of legal
characterization, one that can give direction and structure to
categorization doctrine.
Over the centuries, theoretical explanations of the reasons for generic
distinctions have become more sophisticated. The trend has been away
from what might be called a “folk conception” of genre as “natural
kind” and toward understanding generic distinctions as social practices
enabling the sophisticated coordination of human activity.
1. Folk and Pre-Romantic Conceptions of Genre
When they refer to “genre,” lawyers and legal scholars are usually
drawing on a simple folk conception of genre. 255 For much of Western
intellectual history, this folk conception—which understands texts as
falling into natural kinds—was the primary attitude toward written
genres, and it still has a strong hold on most of us. 256 In learned writing
on the subject, however, the folk conception came into question in the
early nineteenth century and is now largely discredited.
The folk conception of genre is an example of what linguist George
Lakoff calls a folk conception of categorization. 257 Those who hold to
this conception think of communications as falling into distinct

255. References to statutes as a single unified genre of legal discourse, contrasted with other
genres such as contracts or decisional law, are not uncommon. See, e.g., Dennis Kurzon, Themes,
Hyperthemes, and the Discourse Structure of British Legal Texts, 4 TEXT: AN INTERDISC. J. FOR
THE STUDY OF DISCOURSE 31, 32, 45 (1984) (referring to statutory law as “genre” of legal
discourse). At the other end of the spectrum of classification, some authors have described every
statute as a kind of genre of its own. See, e.g., Geoffrey Bowman, The Art of Legislative
Drafting, 7 EUR. J.L. & REFORM 3, 4 (2005) (“[A]ll Bills are different. . . . The legislative drafter
can very rarely draw on a precedent. Each Bill needs to be approached as a unique exercise.”);
see also id. at 6, 14, 16 (summarizing Justices Ginsburg’s and Scalia’s use of the term and
discussing tendency to think of statutory types as “natural kinds”); supra notes 236–37 and
accompanying text (same).
256. Much contemporary popular discourse reinforces this understanding, especially the
marketing and criticism of popular books, music, and film, the main examples of generic
identification that non-specialists encounter. See, e.g., Manohla Dargis, The Janitor, It Seems,
Always Rings Twice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010, at C6 (describing the movie DON MCKAY (Image
Entertainment 2009) as “an oddball comedy with the knowing, festering heart of a neo-noir,” and
subsequently listing features of the movie that justify this classification: the protagonist receives a
“blast out of the past”; “a phantom lady beckons”; the protagonist “heads down mystery street”).
257. GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES
REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 5 (1987).
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categories that preexist the identification of any distinctions among the
categories. 258 From this perspective, a genre is understood as a group
of communications sharing certain properties, especially formal ones
such as structure, point of view, and vocabulary, as well as content.259
Identifying the properties shared by the members of a genre, from the
folk conception, allows us to understand reality better and thus,
secondarily, to orient our action with respect to the communications and
each other in consistent and understandable ways. 260
The earliest Western writing on literary genres—major instances
being Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s Poetics, and Horace’s Ars Poetica—
exemplified this approach. Plato, Aristotle, and Horace explained the
specific distinctions they drew (between, for example, epic and dramatic
poetry) as flowing directly from underlying ethical and even
metaphysical differences between categories, or “kinds,” of people and
experience. They distinguished different types of communication in
“essentializing” ways, as natural vessels for features such as meter,
subject matter, and differences in ethos among authors. 261 Horace’s Ars
Poetica went so far as to identify generic distinctions with natural laws,
suggesting that such distinctions were neither products of human
decision nor susceptible to deliberate alteration by humans. 262 Classical
authors writing on genre did not deny the functional dimensions of
generic distinctions; Aristotle, in particular, distinguished modes of
poetry in part based on their different effects on audiences. 263 In
general, however, classical discussions of genre regarded genres

258. See supra note 236 (discussing the notion of “natural kinds”).
259. See, e.g., DAVID DUFF, ROMANTICISM AND THE USES OF GENRE 31–32 (2009) (“The
basic premisses of neoclassical genre theory can be briefly stated. A genre is a ‘species of
composition’ (other common terms are ‘kind,’ ‘order,’ ‘class’) defined by subject matter, form,
and/or purpose. There are a finite number of genres, each of which has its own ‘laws’ or ‘rules,’
adherence to which is necessary for a successful performance of that genre. The rules specify
permissible subject matter, external form (including metre), and type of language. These features
must be internally consistent, in accordance with the principle of decorum, or ‘propriety,’ which
states that the elements of a work must match one another and fit the intended purposes of that
type of writing. The rules, codified by critics, are derived from the practice of specified
authors . . . .”).
260. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POETICS, § 1, Pt. 1 (“I propose to treat of Poetry in itself and in its
various kinds, noting the essential quality of each. . . . Following the order of nature, let us begin
with the principles which come first.”).
261. Joseph Farrell, Classical Genre in Theory and Practice, 34 NEW LITERARY HIST. 383,
383 (2003). See id. at 384–86, 394 (further developing the point).
262. Id. at 394.
263. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POETICS, Pts. XII–XIV (discussing effects of tragedy); see also
Daniel Javitch, The Emergence of Poetic Genre Theory in the Sixteenth Century, 59 MOD.
LANGUAGE Q. 139, 146 (1998) (noting Aristotle’s statement that the kinds of mimesis are
distinguishable according to means, objects, and modes).
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themselves as formal, fixed, and preexisting their descriptions. The
higher-order rules for characterizing particular communications were
based on static features of the communications and prohibited assigning
a communication to more than one category.
Much the same was true throughout early modern European writing
on genre. 264 Horatian-style normativity remained central to writing
about genre during this era. 265 Eventually, however, writers on genre
began to perceive that classical and neoclassical genre theory was
descriptively inaccurate in certain ways. 266 Horace himself, they noted,
had freely mixed subject matter and formal features that classical theory
assigned to distinct genres. 267 As a result, theorists began to move
beyond the enumeration of generic features to offer new explanations of
the practice of distinction-drawing. 268 By the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, a more historicized, functionalist approach to
genre was gaining acceptance. 269 Theorists taking this approach
264. For David Duff’s description of the neoclassical paradigm, see supra note 259.
Sixteenth-century Italian writing on genre elaborated on Aristotelian distinctions without
departing from the folk conception. See Alastair Fowler, The Formation of Genres in the
Renaissance and After, 34 NEW LITERARY HIST. 185, 186 (2003) (noting that Renaissance
theorists were “more concerned with defining vague entities and invented categories than with
describing kinds actually practiced”). Renaissance genre theorists continued to assume that
writing about genre should focus on identifying standards that could be used to fix a
communication within a genre. Daniel Javitch has explained the proliferation of new generic
categories and criteria in the Renaissance as based on the need for models for literary production
and evaluation in a context in which classical categories had lost some functionality. See Javitch,
supra note 263, at 141, 143 (noting that after the 1530s, an increasing number of writers wanted
“normative accounts” of “the differences between the genres” and turned to Aristotle for this
purpose); see also id. at 166–69 (further developing the point).
265. See, e.g., GERARD GENETTE, THE ARCHITEXT: AN INTRODUCTION 5, 33–36 (Jane E.
Lewin trans., 1992) (describing the process by which theorists accommodated new observations
about genre practices within classical normative framework); see also DUFF, supra note 259, at
28–32 (describing the same process, as illustrated by particular eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury rhetorical works).
266. See Farrell, supra note 261, at 402 (“[T]he ‘implied theory’ instantiated in ancient poetry
is far more sophisticated than the explicit theory developed by philosophers and literary critics
and apparently espoused by the poets themselves . . . .”).
267. Id. at 395.
268. See Fowler, supra note 264, at 186 (explaining how Joseph Scaliger’s Poetice (1561), a
foundational work in this tradition, initiated a skepticism about the purposes of writing on genre
that competed with the early modern neoclassical approach to genre); see also DUFF, supra note
259, at 28–41 (narrating developments in neoclassical genre theory through the Renaissance and
early modern period); GENETTE, supra note 265, at 5–42 (discussing developments in thinking
about genre before the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
269. See DUFF, supra note 259, at 41, 60–94, 108 (noting, inter alia, the effects of Benthamite
utilitarianism on writing and thinking about genre); Michael B. Prince, Mauvais Genres, 34 NEW
LITERARY HIST. 452, 454–76 (2003) (describing the shift away from neoclassical conceptions of
literary genre in the eighteenth century as a function of crises in the epistemology and
metaphysics of categorization generally).
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explained the classification of communications based on principles
other than the natural laws invoked by earlier theory. Unlike their
predecessors, Romantic-era writers were willing to acknowledge that,
for example, a genre distinction initially made in the fifth century might
not be meaningful for the nineteenth century—both because texts
created in the nineteenth century would not likely have the same
characteristics as texts created in the fifth century (making the older
distinction still valid for older texts, but not for new ones), and because
the distinction itself might serve a different function at the later time
(making the old distinction perhaps useless even as to the texts it had
originally been used to classify). This perspective implied that
particular categories of communications could become obsolete, and
also that new categories could both deliberately and inadvertently be
brought into being. 270 Observations of this sort called for a new
explanation of the reasons we make generic distinctions.
2. Post-Romantic Writing on Genre
Since the nineteenth century, writing on genre has not only offered
new descriptions of genre distinctions but also, partly as a result,
expanded its scope greatly to address many kinds of communications
about which classical and neoclassical theory were silent—everything
from business letters to instruction manuals. 271 Contemporary writing
on genre has also become more theoretically powerful and ambitious; it
explains categorizing and creative decisions about genre as linked,
complementary aspects of a social activity that confer meaning on
human action and help us align our mutual expectations. 272
This understanding of why people make generic distinctions is deeply
functionalist. For Aristotle, function was an inherent property of
different literary natural kinds: every type of text had one proper
function. 273 The Romantics and post-Romantics, in contrast, came to
regard the functions of a communication as potentially varying
depending on historical and social context. This understanding flowed
270. See DUFF, supra note 259, at 60–94 (describing the development of Romantic genre
theory).
271. See supra note 222 (recounting in more detail the course of, and reasons for, this
expansion).
272. See FOWLER, supra note 223, at 22 (“[T]here is no doubt that genre primarily has to do
with communication. It is an instrument not primarily of classification or prescription, but of
meaning.”); JOHN FROW, GENRE 19 (2006) (“Genre . . . works at a level of semiosis—that is, of
meaning-making—which is deeper and more forceful than that of the explicit ‘content’ of a
text.”); Carolyn Miller, Genre as Social Action, 70 Q.J. OF SPEECH 151, 163 (1984) (defining
genre as form “at one particular level that is a fusion of lower-level forms and characteristic
substance”).
273. See supra note 263 (noting Aristotle’s views on the effects of different genres).
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from increased attention to readers’ roles and interests in making and
recognizing distinctions among “kinds,” in addition to the roles of text
and creator in constraining those distinctions. 274 From this perspective,
generic differences are explained as functions of perception, situation,
and motivated action.
A central premise of contemporary genre theory is that
comprehension of any communication occurs partly through
identification of the genre or genres to which the communication
belongs. Generic classification, that is, is a component of interpretation.
More specifically, generic identity is a dimension of meaning
irreducible to other dimensions of meaning, one that cannot be fully
captured in descriptions of particular aspects of form or content, but
rather derives from the relation of aspects of form and content to each
other, to similar aspects of other communications, and to the
communication’s original context and its context of reception. The
explicit identification of a communication as participating in a genre
thus in turn contributes to the meaning of that communication.
An influential early articulation of this understanding was a 1984
essay by the rhetorician Carolyn Miller, Genre as Social Action.275
Miller argued that genre identifications, properly understood, focus “not
on the substance or the form of discourse but on the action it is used to
accomplish.” 276 She described genres as “rhetorical means for
mediating private intentions and social exigence,” 277 or practical social
demands, and as vehicles for “conventionalized social purpose, or
exigence, within the recurrent situation.” 278 The currently prevailing
view in genre theory follows Miller in considering genre distinctions to
be not abstract formal constraints but rather recognizable, material
clusters of communicative patterning that emerge from the joint use
people make of communications. 279 On this understanding, we are
driven to make generic distinctions (and to recognize new genres) not
just out of a compulsion to conform to past practices, but also out of a

274. See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 259, at 43, 46, 108 (presenting historical examples of
arguments for a more context- and reader-focused approach to genre).
275. Miller, supra note 272. According to Google Scholar, as of September 2012, Miller’s
article had been cited more than 1700 times. GOOGLE SCHOLAR, http://scholar.google.com
(search “Carolyn Miller + Genre as Social Action”; the number of times article is cited is directly
below article hyperlink and description).
276. Miller, supra note 272, at 151.
277. Id. at 163. Miller’s use of the term “exigence” reflects her influence by Kenneth Burke.
See infra note 280.
278. Miller, supra note 272, at 162.
279. Fowler, supra note 264, at 190.
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constant need to stabilize our own, and others’, expectations. 280
Generic classification fulfills this need by implying a frame or script for
action and expectation; such a classification does more than refer to a
blueprint underlying the text. 281 This understanding explains more than
the folk conception or classical understanding of genres had, but also
suggests a paradox: “[P]eople recognize recurring situations because
they know genres, yet genres exist only because people have acted as
though situations have recurred.” 282 How, that is, can we explain when
particular generic distinctions are merited, or functional, without
stepping into the future to see whether they “work” to align
expectations?
3. Contemporary Genre Theory and the “Law” of Genre
Contemporary genre theorists have developed a coherent new
account of why, in general, we make generic distinctions and have
persuasively shown that we do so in an unexpectedly wide variety of
settings—virtually every time we seek to comprehend a communication.
These theorists have been less successful in explaining the persistence
of the folk conception of genre; even sophisticated theorists are still
drawn to treat generic distinctions as a kind of “law.” 283 Contemporary
accounts of genre focus above all on description but sometimes slip into
a prescriptive vocabulary, referring to genre distinctions as matters of
rule-following 284 and struggling to account for this prescriptive
280. See, e.g., KENNETH BURKE, COUNTER-STATEMENT 124 (1968) (presenting an early
version of this argument); DEVITT, supra note 222, at 78, 98, 138, 141 (elaborating on the
implications of genre as a device for shaping expectations); FROW, supra note 272, at 19, 83–87
(discussing “genre as [cognitive] schema”).
281. DEVITT, supra note 222, at 182–83. Think of the expectations you develop as a movie
viewer upon learning or recognizing that a movie belongs to a particular genre. Like
characterizing a legal rule, identifying the genre of a movie has consequences for expectation and
action.
282. Id. at 21.
283. See Jacques Derrida, The Law of Genre, 7 CRITICAL INQUIRY 55, 56, 58, 77 (Avital
Ronell trans., 1980) (noting that references to genre invariably invoke a “limit” or interdiction).
See also David Duff, Intertextuality Versus Genre Theory: Bakhtin, Kristeva, and the Question of
Genre, 25 PARAGRAPH 54, 56 (2002) (discussing Derrida’s critique of genre theory).
284. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 272, at 164 (arguing that genre is inherently a normative
concept, and in particular that Environmental Impact Statements do not constitute a genre because
they have no “coherent pragmatic force” or “satisfactory fusion of function and form”); DEVITT,
supra note 222, at 141 (“Once established, genres operate as language standards, like ‘proper
English.’”); FROW, supra note 272, at 101–02 (describing genre as “a constraint on semiosis, the
production of meaning” that “specifies which types of meaning are relevant and appropriate in a
given context”). It seems possible that this issue has been a difficult one for genre theory because
of the contexts and purposes of that tradition of writing. Theories of genre have historically been
written by and for people working outside the law, that is, working with language whose effects
on behavior are not institutionalized in a legal or coercive apparatus but depend on consensus and
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dimension of genre in terms that do more than copy Horace’s model.
On this point, genre theorists might have something to learn from
judicial approaches to legal characterization.
Legal theory and doctrine have long explored the normative force of
particular instances of communication, as well as particular instances of
categorization. 285 Many (though not all) such questions are internalized
in legal training and addressed in doctrine. 286 The legally trained
intuitively, if not explicitly, understand that particular instances of
classification gain their normative force as a result of processes similar
to those described by genre theorists.
Some individuals and
institutions—such as legislators, law revision committees, legal
publishers, judges, and treatise authors—are accorded authority, by
social practice and other institutional mechanisms, to make
classifications that others will treat as having normative force. 287 The
characterization doctrines discussed above represent judicial attempts to
work through precisely these questions, although Supreme Court
Justices seem to have been conscious of this activity only in the
jurisdictional-characterization cases. In both doctrinal areas, however,
as a result of these efforts, the pertinent issues have come into sharper
focus over time. Substantive-procedural characterization doctrine has
established that characterization may be necessary because existing
authorities (such as Erie precedents and the REA) contemplate or
presuppose such characterization; 288 that the characterization of legal
rules generated by different institutions (such as state statutes and
federal rules) may require different kinds of analysis and
acculturation. Since Horace, poetics has thus borrowed from legal vocabulary to describe a
feature of categorizing language that is so pervasive in legal communication that it is taken for
granted. See supra notes 248–50 and accompanying text (discussing how legal scholarship
naturally places statutes into classifications).
285. For example, in an influential 1935 article, Felix Cohen argued that the reasons given for
an interpretive conclusion in a judicial opinion—the rules putatively “followed” by that
decision—ordinarily and logically have little or nothing to do with the process of reaching that
conclusion. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 811–12 (1935). For examples of more recent explorations of this issue, see
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULEBASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 112–28 (1991) (discussing the normative force
of rules in justification); Martin Stone, Focusing the Law: What Legal Interpretation Is Not, in
LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 31, 31–96 (Andrei Marmor ed.,
1995) (using Wittgensteinian perspective to explain the validity of Cohen’s point).
286. See supra notes 24–27, 36, 39–45, 60–64, 93–100 and accompanying text (discussing
areas of legal doctrine and instruction that depend on categorization of legal texts).
287. Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979)
(presenting theory of legal authority based on deference to others’ decisions).
288. See supra notes 60–66, 90–111 and accompanying text (describing statutory justification
for requiring characterization in the context of Erie doctrine).
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justification; 289 that characterization has a variety of consequences, or
may play different roles in the logic of a judicial rationale (establishing
conflict between two rules or, on the contrary, demonstrating the
absence of conflict); 290 and most generally that, as Cook argued,
characterization is always performed for some practical purpose (in the
Erie context, the judicial delimitation of the scope of federal legislative
and judicial power). 291 Jurisdictional-characterization doctrine has
recently developed more robust guidelines for justifying some of the
analogous characterization decisions that must be made in that area of
law. 292 Issues do remain, however, for resolution in this area. As noted
above, at some point the Court will need to address the characterization
of non-statutory pre-litigation requirements and the conditions under
which the consequences of making a jurisdictional characterization are
independent of one another.
In developing the doctrine that has sharpened these issues, the Court
has wrestled directly with exploring and justifying the normative
consequences of characterization decisions.
Not always selfconsciously, the Court has developed a set of higher-order rules for
some characterization decisions.
These rules reflect a highly
functionalist understanding of such decisions along lines similar to
those developed in genre theory. In the process, the Court has from
time to time recognized its own practical, institutional, and social
responsibility for developing these higher-order rules. Indeed, among
all the institutions granted authority to make normative classifications in
our current social arrangement, courts of last resort may be uniquely
well situated to develop these kinds of classificatory rules. Unlike most
other legal interpreters, the judges of these courts are able to take into
account all of the prior characterization decisions made by legislative
drafters and boards of revision, as well as parties and lawyers, lower
court judges, and previous Justices. 293
Still, the Court and its commentators might have something to learn

289. See supra Part I.C (discussing doctrinal recognition of source-based justifications for
characterization); see also infra notes 306–08 and accompanying text (discussing the need to
determine whether interpretation of Federal Rules should differ from interpretation of statutory
law).
290. See supra notes 90–111 and accompanying text (discussing divergent positions on this
point taken in the Shady Grove opinions).
291. See supra notes 20–21, 32–35, 52, 63–64, 81 and accompanying text (describing Cook’s
argument to this effect and its recurrence in doctrine and commentary).
292. See supra Parts II.C–E (outlining the emerging consensus on framework for making and
justifying jurisdictional-characterization decisions).
293. See supra note 281 and accompanying text (explaining the importance of prior
characterizations to the expectation-stabilizing function of generic distinctions).
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from the work summarized in this Part. Contemporary genre theory
holds that a genre exists when patterns of communication recur to
address a recurrent situation and are recognized as recurring.294
Identifying the genre to which a communication belongs adds to the
repertoire of tools available to explain the meaning of that
communication. This is an inevitably recursive process, and as a result,
there can be no such thing as a final “comprehensive map” of genres,
statutory or otherwise. 295 A corollary of this insight, implicit in the
Court’s practices but less universally embraced by commentators, is the
insusceptibility of legal-characterization issues to exclusively formalist
resolution in any stable way. Insistence on fixed bright-line grounds for
the distinction of substantive from procedural and jurisdictional from
nonjurisdictional rules—grounds preexisting the drawing of such
distinctions in individual cases—are thus both theoretically unsound
and practically counterproductive.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF GENRE THEORY FOR CHARACTERIZATION
DOCTRINES
The above discussion has already suggested many of the implications
of these comparisons—between doctrines, as well as between doctrine
and theory—for the further development of the law of legal
characterization. These implications may be drawn out even more to
identify the most pressing needs in the development of Erie doctrine
and jurisdictional-characterization doctrine. Mapping out an agenda to
meet these needs is the purpose of this final Part. In the Erie area,
courts should not be leery of substantive-procedural characterization but
rather should be willing to consider all the circumstances that might be
relevant to the assessment. Clarity on this point would force more
direct recognition of the fact that different types of conflicts or choice
between state and federal law may exist and more explicit deliberation
about how these issues should be resolved. In the jurisdictionalcharacterization area, judicial reluctance to characterize is not the
problem; constructive development of the doctrine requires merely an
effort to reach comparable consensus on such associated issues as the
extent to which features of jurisdictional rules (mandatoriness,
294. See, e.g., DEVITT, supra note 222, at 20–21 (“Preexisting genres are part of what enable
individuals to move from their unique experiences and perceptions to a shared understanding of
recurring situation. . . . [T]he act of constructing the genre—of classifying a text as similar to
other texts—is also the act of constructing the situation.”); FROW, supra note 272, at 157–58
(noting, inter alia, that “we have many and confused intentions, but few effective orientation
centers for joint action” and that “this may be why the whole matter of genre has become
problematic”).
295. Fowler, supra note 264, at 248.
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nonwaivability, nonforfeitability) may be disaggregated from one
another, and the extent to which the analytic framework the Court has
developed for statutory characterization similarly applies to the
characterization of Federal Rules.
A. Erie Doctrine: Confronting Source Distinctions and Doctrinal
Overlaps
Since the origins of Erie doctrine, many of those contributing to its
development seem to have regarded substantive-procedural
characterization as a distastefully formalist exercise. 296 In recent
decades, however, Justices who seem inclined to adopt this attitude
toward Erie doctrine have also countenanced the development of a
fairly structured doctrine of jurisdictional characterization. 297 Practices
in the latter area suggest, nevertheless, that the development of higherorder rules for the characterization of other legal rules need not be an
exclusively formalist undertaking. Rather, since characterization is an
aspect of interpretation—the process of making law meaningful—it
necessarily has both formal and functional dimensions. 298
Other specific areas of disagreement have stood in the way of
developing a unified doctrine of characterization for Erie purposes.
Justices disagree about, first, whether characterization is required for
federal laws only, or also for the state laws or rules involved in an Erie
choice; and, second, the importance of direct conflict between the state
and federal rules at issue, including the question of how such conflict is
to be detected and, of course, the question how of it is to be resolved if
present. 299
The first of these questions cannot be answered in the abstract, since
the need for characterization depends on the circumstances in which it is
being contemplated. Erie doctrine has simply recognized that even if
substantive-procedural characterization does not seem necessary to
decide a particular case, other types of source-based characterization—
most basically, the classification of legal rules as state or federal law—
are essential to determining whether a case even presents an Erie issue.
Beyond this recognition, several strands of Erie doctrine, notably
Hanna, acknowledge a need to engage in other source-based
296. See, e.g., supra notes 46–58, 83–84, 90, 104 and accompanying text (discussing
recurrence of this theme in Erie doctrine).
297. See, e.g., Parts II.C, II.E, and II.F (discussing the structured framework for jurisdictional
characterization).
298. See discussion supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the post-Romantic recognition of
relationship between formal and functional dimensions of genre classifications).
299. See supra notes 90–111 and accompanying text (discussing Shady Grove).
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characterizations. 300 The federal rule at issue may be constitutional,
statutory, contained in a Rule, or decisional (common-law or doctrinal),
and the state rule at issue may fall into any of these categories as well.
Hanna suggested, and Justice Scalia continues to insist, that if the
federal law at issue is a properly promulgated Federal Rule, the inquiry
is over. 301 The table below shows how this type of secondary
characterization is implicit in cases recognized as falling within the
Hanna model. 302

Constitution

Statute

Rule

Decision

Constitution

No existing
framework

No existing
framework

Hanna
[could be
extended to]

No existing
framework

Statute

No existing
framework

No existing
framework

Hanna:
If Rule is
valid, apply
federal law

No existing
framework

Rule

No existing
framework

No existing
framework

Hanna
[could be
extended to]

No existing
framework

Decision

STATE LAW

FEDERAL LAW

No existing
framework

No existing
framework

Hanna
[could be
extended to]

No existing
framework

Of course, not every Erie case poses a clear conflict between a
federal rule and a state statute or rule. As the table above suggests, the
Hanna framework does not directly resolve many other types of
conflicts. Nevertheless, in resolving any of these conflicts, sourcebased characterization may be an important factor. Where the federal
300. See supra Part I.C (discussing characterizations made in Hanna and subsequent
decisions).
301. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (concerning identification of the central issue
in Hanna). See also supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s similar
position in Shady Grove).
302. The table illustrates that determining whether Hanna applies to a given case presumes
some source-based characterization. It also shows that Hanna provides a rule for only a limited
number of the scenarios in which Erie issues may arise.
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law is clearly of constitutional status, for example, precedent suggests
that the conflict should be resolved in favor of the federal law. 303 An
important shortcoming of purely source-based characterization is that
rules for the resolution of conflict do not help a court determine that
conflict is present in the first place.
Substantive-procedural
characterization may be a component—but only one component—of the
analysis needed to answer this question. State and federal rules falling
into different categories (substantive or procedural) will not conflict,
while state and federal rules falling into the same category might.
Determining the presence of conflict thus involves two analytic steps:
first, characterizing the laws at issue; and second, if they fall into the
same category, determining whether they conflict, and, if so, how. 304
As this Article has argued, the first of these steps is closely akin to
the task of jurisdictional characterization. In the Erie context, as in the
context of jurisdictional characterization, it should be possible to forge a
framework acceptable to judges of different methodological inclinations
by encouraging the characterizer to focus first on textual and structural
indicia of character (some of which will be source-based, others more
reminiscent of familiar interpretive details such as word choice and rule
structure), and then on context, including past forms of the rule, past
judicial treatment of the rule, and inferences about the purposes of the
rule (either to influence primary conduct or to influence litigation
conduct) that may be drawn from this contextual information.
Characterization along these lines is a matter of interpreting the state
and federal laws at issue. Straightforwardly acknowledging as much
would give judges some common ground for agreement on
characterization issues—surely an advance over current practice, in
which some judges abjure the characterization process entirely while
others insist on it. 305 Because it is a matter of interpretation, this
characterization will be most straightforward for federal statutes, Rules,
and doctrines. Federal courts already understand themselves to be
interpreting federal law every day, in nearly every case they decide.
The inquiry may be less straightforward when the federal court turns to
characterization and interpretation of the state law at issue. 306 Since
303. See supra notes 56–58, 79–85 and accompanying text (discussing Erie decisions
considering the relation between constitutional and statutory law).
304. The disagreements in Shady Grove seem to stem partly from disagreement over the need
to disaggregate these two inquiries, as suggested in supra notes 99–111 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (summarizing conflicting positions on this
point exhibited in the Shady Grove opinions).
306. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law”
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intersystemic
Interpretation] (discussing the implications for Erie analysis of considering state court
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state court interpretation practices differ in certain regards from federal
court practices, 307 federal courts may need to take state interpretive
practices into account in characterizing the state laws at issue,
depending on the legal status of those state court practices in the
relevant jurisdiction. 308
Determining the presence or absence of conflict between federal and
state rules is also an interpretive activity. If the characterization
analysis clearly indicates that the federal and state laws fall into
different categories, no conflict should be possible, and the inquiry will
end. But this clarity will not be available in every case. Much of the
confusion about substantive-procedural characterization in the caselaw
stems from the possibility of characterizing a single rule as both
substantive and procedural, or as procedural for one purpose and
substantive for another. When this occurs in the Erie context, the
presence of conflict should be determined by reference to the purposes
of making any Erie decision: giving effect to the Rules of Decision Act
(RDA) in light of general principles of federal law. The RDA requires
federal courts to give effect to state “rules of decision”; the U.S.
Constitution makes federal law the supreme law of the land. In effect,
then, Erie cases require federal courts to decide whether state “rules of
decision” with some substantive component are preempted by federal
law touching the same issues or conduct. This last, crucial step of Erie
analysis, where required, thus is akin to the analysis of preemption
issues more generally. Just as the characterization component can
usefully borrow from jurisdictional-characterization doctrine, so too
may this component borrow from another already well-developed body
of federal doctrine—a controversial one, to be sure, but one still marked
by more agreement on basic principles than is current Erie doctrine.309
interpretive methodologies to be forms of law equal in authority to state common law and
statutes).
307. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010)
[hereinafter Gluck, States as Laboratories] (exploring a variety of interpretive practices used in
several state supreme courts).
308. From this perspective, it is perhaps fortunate that interpretive methodologies (possibly
including characterization doctrine) do not enjoy the status of law in the federal system, despite
Gluck’s persuasive arguments that this lack of binding legal status is undesirable. See Gluck,
States as Laboratories, supra note 307, at 1766. If interpretive methodologies counted as federal
legal rules, courts facing Erie questions in cases in which federal and state interpretive
methodologies differ would also need to choose between state and federal law on this point. See
generally Gluck, Intersystemic Interpretation, supra note 306. Under the current system, they
need not do so.
309. For recent discussions of preemption doctrine and practice, see FEDERAL PREEMPTION:
STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007);
THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP
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To summarize, the resources for developing a broadly acceptable,
more structured framework for the analysis of Erie issues are already
implicit in Erie precedents and in related areas of federal decisional law.
Federal courts deciding Erie cases should more explicitly and
systematically identify the state and federal laws in controversy;
characterize both state and federal laws according to source and as
either substantive, procedural, or an identifiable combination, using the
text-, structure-, and context-focused interpretive tools developed in
jurisdictional-characterization doctrine; and, if the questions of conflict
and preemption have not been settled by an earlier step in the analysis,
answer these questions as straightforward preemption issues.
B. Jurisdictional-Characterization: Clarifying Consequences,
Interpreting Rules
In the jurisdictional-characterization area, the Court and the legal
academy seem to have been engaged recently in similar enterprises: the
articulation and stabilization of expectations concerning the treatment of
certain legal texts through the development of higher-order
characterization rules. As a result, jurisdictional-characterization
doctrine has developed along lines consonant with contemporary genre
theory, which acknowledges that formal features of the text being
classified play a role in classification decisions alongside past treatment
of that text and the consequences of characterizing it. Still, some
questions remain open. One question is the issue of the consequences
of jurisdictional characterization (or more precisely, characterization of
a rule as nonjurisdictional): to what extent, and when, do rules
characterized as nonjurisdictional share features of jurisdictional rules,
such as mandatoriness, nonwaivability, and nonforfeitability? 310
Another is the question of how Federal Rules are to be characterized. 311
LOCAL JURIES (2008); PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF
FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009); Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the
Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967 (2002); Gregory M. Dickinson, An
Empirical Study of Obstacle Preemption in the Supreme Court, 89 NEB. L. REV. 682 (2011); Viet
D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000); Michael S. Greve &
Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43 (2006); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102
NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2008); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000); Mark D.
Rosen, Contextualizing Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 781 (2008).
310. This question has been a focus of Scott Dodson’s recent work; he has explored it in
particular depth in the articles cited supra notes 4 and 123.
311. In one sense, Rules by definition cannot be jurisdictional. See FED. R. CIV. P. 82 (“These
rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts or the venue of actions in those
courts.”); see also Burbank, supra note 35, at 1148 (discussing Rule drafters’ understanding of
this particular limitation on the judicial rulemaking power).
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As Scott Dodson’s recent work suggests, decisions about the practical
consequences of characterizing rules as jurisdictional or
nonjurisdictional should consider the same indicia that bear on the
jurisdictional-characterization inquiry. 312
Text (especially the
appearance of verbs conventionally considered “mandatory”), context,
and prior treatment would all be appropriate to the analysis. In addition,
judges already consider—if less than systematically—information about
actual litigant expectations and conduct, including information about
how and when parties actually did and are likely or provided with
incentives to communicate complaints about opposing-party
noncompliance to the opposing party and the court. Taking this
information more explicitly into account, and encouraging parties to
draft briefs presenting it, would allow courts deciding about the
consequences of characterization to take into consideration the
characterization activities of all relevant actors—lawmakers, courts, and
litigants—in crafting higher-order guidelines for characterization
beyond the jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional distinction.
This Article has repeatedly stressed that legal characterization is not
just a form of textual characterization but also a form of legal
interpretation—the attribution of meaning to legal provisions. Thus far,
jurisdictional-characterization doctrine has developed relatively
straightforwardly as a specialized branch of statutory interpretation,
although no Justice has explicitly recognized it as such. Yet it is
arguably the familiarity of this framework that has allowed consensus in
the area. 313 The characterization of Federal Rules is likewise a type of
Rule interpretation. But the interpretation of Federal Rules, some have
argued, may require adjustments to prevailing practices of statutory
interpretation. 314 Such arguments focus on the fact that different legal
rules are generated by different authorities through different processes.
312. See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text (summarizing Dodson’s
recommendations).
313. Gluck describes an analogous consensus in some state courts on issues of statutory
interpretation; these courts, she shows, have converged on an approach to statutory interpretation,
“modified textualism,” that has features appealing to both textualist (formalist) and purposivist
(functionalist) judges. Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 307, at 1829–46.
314. See, e.g., David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927 (arguing for an approach to Rule interpretation
that takes into account special circumstances under which Rules are drafted and amended); Karen
Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1093 (1993) (“Given the[] substantial . . . powers of the Court in the
promulgation process [for Federal Rules], a more activist role in the interpretative stage . . . is
appropriate.”); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1102 (2002) (“Congress’s delegation of rulemaking
authority [in the REA] should constrain, rather than liberate, courts’ interpretation of the Rules.”).
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The Supreme Court has sometimes treated Rules just like statutes for
purposes of interpretation, but Curry (a pre-Rules decision) could be
read to imply that Federal Rules are categorically different.315
Although no agreement on this issue has emerged among
commentators, there is no reason to think it would be more difficult to
attain judicial consensus in this area than it has been in the context of
the jurisdictional characterization of statutes. So far, jurisdictionalcharacterization doctrine has developed in ways that seem satisfactory
to Justices espousing different interpretive philosophies (including the
textualist Justice Scalia and the purposivists Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg). This developing framework is respectful of text and
precedent, yet also functionally oriented, and it could be extended to
Rule characterization without sacrificing these attributes. 316
To summarize, we can expect further development of jurisdictionalcharacterization doctrine to clarify the characteristics and practical
consequences of nonjurisdictional rules and to clarify the differences in
analysis, if any, needed for characterization of Federal Rules as opposed
to statutes. While we cannot expect all judges to agree on the
conclusions that should be reached under the existing and extended
frameworks, we can expect the frameworks themselves to continue to
attract broad acceptance. 317
C. Broader Implications
The analysis presented here has implications for other areas of law.
Legal characterization plays a visible role in many other doctrinal areas,
including state constitutional law, 318 First Amendment law, 319 federal
criminal law, 320 immigration law, 321 and administrative law.322 The
315. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (noting the importance of legislative authority
to Curry).
316. The major constraint on extension of statutory-characterization practices to Rule
characterization would be the directive that Federal Rules cannot alter jurisdiction. See supra
note 311.
317. Cf. Gluck, supra note 307, at 1798 (noting that a consensus on interpretive methodology
cannot eliminate “normative disputes in statutory interpretation cases”); see also id. at 1853
(making a similar point).
318. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing the “single-subject rule” in state
constitutional law).
319. See supra notes 2 and 252 (noting case law and scholarship on the First Amendment
law).
320. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., United States v. Morrison and Other Arguments against
Federal “Hate Crime” Legislation, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1191 (2000) (addressing problems with the
categorization of statutes as “hate crime” legislation); Nikhil Bhagat, Note, Filling the Gap?
Non-Abrogation Provisions and the Assimiliative Crimes Act, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 77 (2011)
(discussing analytical issues presented by federal statutes requiring characterization of state
criminal statutes).
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observations above—that characterization is an aspect of interpretation
and that a structured doctrine of characterization is possible—apply to
these areas as well. As an aspect of legal interpretation, characterization
is often inevitable and always context-dependent, but it can still be
disciplined.
At the most general level, the development of legal-characterization
doctrines in the areas described here counsels against too-hasty
dismissal of doctrinal elaboration as undesirably formalist. Only if we
remain committed to a folk conception of categorization is this a
danger. Cook persuasively showed that characterization always has a
purpose and is always undertaken with that purpose in view, and that
categories of legal rules are thus never fixed, even once they are
perceived. But the fact that every characterization decision changes the
possibilities for future characterizations—and that the tasks of
characterization could and should be carried out more self-consciously
in many areas—does not mean we inevitably face the unmanageable
proliferation of doctrinal categories in law, any more than the same
dynamic creates chaos in other areas of human activity. 323 This Article
argues for unification as much as for specification. We need generic
categories to make sense of an already increasingly complex body of
legal rules, and the higher-order rules that characterization doctrine
represents are an important component of our efforts to make those
rules meaningful.
CONCLUSION
Systematic comparison of the Court’s doctrines of substantiveprocedural and jurisdictional characterization brings both areas of law
321. See, e.g., Pooja R. Dadhania, Note, The Categorical Approach for Crimes Involving
Moral Turpitude after Silva-Trevino, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 313 (2011) (considering issues raised
by a Supreme Court decision requiring classification of criminal statutes for purposes of
determining alien’s removability); Cate McGuire, An Unrealistic Burden: Crimes Involving
Moral Turpitude and Silva-Trevino’s Realistic Probability Test, 30 REV. LITIG. 607 (2011)
(similar).
322. See, e.g., Melissa M. Berry, Beyond Chevron’s Domain: Agency Interpretations of
Statutory Procedural Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 541 (2007) (considering the pertinence
of substantive-procedural distinction to application of Chevron doctrine); Franklin, supra note 3
(discussing characterization of agency rules as legislative or nonlegislative); William Funk,
Legislating for Nonlegislative Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1023 (2004) (also addressing this
distinction); Todd D. Rakoff & Takehisa Nakagawa, Introduction: Informality in Administrative
Law—A Transnational Colloquy, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159 (2000) (same); Russell L. Weaver, The
Undervalued Nonlegislative Rule, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 871 (2002) (same).
323. Cf. Dodson, Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, supra note 123, at 17 n.20 (quoting
Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 2–
3 (1992)) (criticizing tendency toward “legal complexity,” defined as systemic “density,
technicality, differentiation, and indeterminacy or uncertainty”).
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into clearer focus. Both types of legal characterization are examples of
a more general legal and indeed human activity—the attribution of
genre to texts—and, as such, both are aspects of legal interpretation.
The Court has appropriately grasped its responsibility for developing
guidelines for the jurisdictional-characterization doctrine, and the
framework it is building strikes a good balance between respect for the
textual choices of lawmakers and sensitivity to the functions of higherorder rules and interpretive decisions. Erie doctrine would benefit from
a similar attitude. Some lines of necessary development in both areas
are implicit in existing judicial practices. Judges making Erie decisions
should explicitly characterize both the state and federal laws at issue
according to their source as well as according to the substantiveprocedural dichotomy, and should recognize that the question of
conflict, if reached, is basically akin to other questions of federal
preemption. Judges making jurisdictional-characterization decisions
should extend the analytic framework that has already been developed
to take account of other characterization consequences and to allow the
analogous handling of Federal Rules. But judges and commentators
should be patient and willing to develop the necessary higher-order
rules incrementally. Such an approach is both theoretically sound and a
practical necessity.

